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Zellmer & Glicksman, Anti-degradation
USING THE PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT LAWS TO IMPROVE WATER
POLLUTION ANTI-DEGRADATION POLICIES
Sandra Zellmer ↓ and Robert L. Glicksman *
Abstract
The Clean Water Act’s principal goal is to “restore and maintain” the integrity of the
nation’s surface water bodies. The Act’s adoption was spurred largely by the perception that
unchecked pollution had caused the degradation of those waters, making them unsuitable for
uses such as fishing and swimming. At the time Congress passed the statute, however, some
lakes, rivers, and streams had water quality that was better than what was needed to support
these uses. An important question was whether the statute would limit discharges with the
potential to impair these high quality waters. EPA’s anti-degradation policy sought to ensure
that it does. This paper assesses the implementation of the anti-degradation policy for
protecting water quality as good as or better than that required by state water quality standards.
It traces the history of the policy, and analyzes the rationales for precluding degradation of high
quality environmental resources reflected in both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. It
assesses how successful the Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation mechanisms have been in
practice, identifying several flaws in the design and implementation of the program. To address
these deficiencies, the article compares the Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation policy to
nonimpairment and nondegradation mandates under the nation’s public natural resource
management statutes. Based on this comparative analysis, and the past four decades of
experience with the Clean Water Act, the paper recommends several reforms to strengthen the
Act’s anti-degradation policy’s capacity to promote its goals.
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INTRODUCTION

The visual images that helped spur the enactment during the 1970s of the nation’s
foundation environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act (CWA), were largely of
contaminated resources, such as burning rivers and oil-soaked seagulls. 1 Similarly, evocative
prose such as Rachel Carson’s description of the “strange blight” 2 afflicting America in the
1960s as a result of the use of chemical pesticides played a critical role in alerting policymakers
and the public alike to the need for new legal protections for public health and the environment.
Over the years, similar depictions of the environmental devastation resulting from unconstrained
economic activity have continued to play an important role in creating the momentum for the
adoption of new or strengthened environmental laws. 3
1

See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59 (2004) (describing “visually unsettling
events” such as the smoldering Cuyahoga River and “seagulls suffocated in oil as a result of the Santa Barbara oil
spill).
2
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin 1994 ed.) (quoted in ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 18 (6th ed. 2011).
3
See, e.g., Martha L. Judy & Katherine N. Probst, Superfund at 30, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 192-93 (2009)
(describing “sites regularly featured on the television news and in news magazines in the late 1970s and early 1980s
[that] set the stage for passage of Superfund,” including the “’Valley of the Drums,’” [which] imprinted on the
screen and in the minds of the American public colorful images of erupting, smoking, seeping, and corroding
drums”); Tina M. Smith, Wildlife Protection and Offshore Drilling: Can There Be a Balance Between the Two?, 6
FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 349, 366 (2011) (quoting NOAA Ocean Service Education, Prince William's Oily Mess: A
Tale of Recovery, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/stories/oilymess/oily01_ infamous.html ) (“The images
Americans saw on television and the descriptions they heard over the radio [after the Exxon Valdez oil spill] ‘were
of heavily oiled shorelines, dead and dying wildlife and thousands of workers mobilized to clean beaches.’”).

2

Environmental law, however, has always been about more than just repairing the damage
wrought by past environmental disasters or mismanagement. Senator Edmund Muskie, the
principal sponsor of the CWA, for example, was moved to action not only by the environmental
despoliation he witnessed, but also by “[t]he beauties of nature . . . in almost pristine form” at
which he marveled while growing up. 4 The nation’s environmental were adopted as much to
preserve superior environmental quality as to restore damaged or degraded resources. 5
The Clean Water Act reflects this dual conception of the function of environmental law. Its
principal goals are to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of
the nation’s surface water bodies. 6 The Act’s adoption was spurred largely by the realization
that unchecked pollution had caused the degradation of those waters, making them unsuitable for
uses such as fishing and swimming. At the time Congress passed the statute, however, some
lakes, rivers, and streams had water quality that was better than what was needed to support these
uses. An important question was whether the statute would limit discharges with the potential to
impair these high quality waters. EPA’s anti-degradation policy provided an affirmative answer.
Yet, the CWA’s maintenance goal has taken a decidedly back seat to its restoration goal, as both
the paucity of statutory text on anti-degradation issues and the emphasis of federal and state
implementation on improving the quality of impaired waters attest.
This article focuses on the CWA’s relatively neglected maintenance aspects. It assesses the
degree to which federal and state implementation of the anti-degradation policy for protecting
water quality as good or better than that required by state water quality standards has fostered the
statutory maintenance goal. Part II traces the history of the policy, and analyzes the rationales
for precluding degradation of high quality environmental resources reflected in both the CWA
and the Clean Air Act. Part III assesses whether the CWA’s anti-degradation mechanisms have
succeeded, and identifies several flaws in the program’s design and implementation. Part IV
compares the CWA’s anti-degradation policy to nonimpairment and nondegradation mandates
under the nation’s public natural resource management statutes. Based on this comparative
analysis, and the past four decades of experience with the CWA, Part V recommends four
reforms to strengthen the Act’s anti-degradation policy. First, we recommend a federal
regulation requiring states to designate outstanding national resource waters (ONRWs) in their
water quality standard inventories, including waters within parks and wildlife refuges and other
waters of “exceptional ecological significance.” In addition, we support requiring states to take
concrete steps (including reducing aggregate discharges) to restore the quality of degraded high
quality or exceptional waters so that they can support a full suite of beneficial uses and
ecosystem services. Second, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should define
degradation by regulation to include the impairment of water quality that either results in loss or
4

Robert F. Blomquist, “To Stir up Public Interest”: Edmund S. Muskie and the U.S. Senate Special Subcommittee’s
Water Pollution Investigations and Legislative Activities, 1963-66 – A Case Study in Early Congressional
Environmental Policy Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting EDMUND S. MUSKIE, JOURNEYS
79-80 (1972)).
5
See, e.g., the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006) (enunciating Congress’s goal of administering
wilderness areas “in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for the future use and preservation as wilderness, so
as to provide for the protection of these areas [and] the preservation of their wilderness character”).
6
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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threatened loss of an existing or potentially viable use – especially fishing, swimming, and
higher uses – or adversely affects the ecological resilience of the affected water body. Third, we
support requiring states to extend their anti-degradation programs to cover nonpoint source
pollutants. Finally, to ensure proper implementation of the anti-degradation policy, EPA should
adopt mandatory state planning and assessment responsibilities, particularly as applied to
ONRWs. These reforms would help fulfill the objectives of the anti-degradation program, move
the nation closer to the goal of ensuring the integrity of our surface waters, and help the CWA
function as more than just an impaired waters restoration mechanism.
II.

THE HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND GOALS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S ANTIDEGRADATION PROGRAM

Federal efforts to prevent degradation of water quality predate the adoption of the Clean
Water Act. Congress endorsed these efforts when it amended the Act in 1977, although the
cryptic manner in which it did so left the scope and content of the resulting anti-degradation
program unclear. This part reviews the history of federal efforts to prevent degradation of water
resources and the structure of the current regulatory program. It also describes the goals of both
water and air pollution anti-degradation provisions.
A. The History of Federal Anti-degradation Programs in Water Pollution Control
Before EPA’s creation in 1970, the Department of the Interior adopted guidelines to
implement the 1965 Water Quality Act, 7 which required all states to adopt water quality
standards consisting of use designations (such as drinking or fishing) and water quality
characteristics needed to permit those uses to occur. 8 The guidelines provided that “[i]n no case
will standards providing for less than existing water quality be acceptable,” and required that
standards provide for “[t]he maintenance and protection of quality and use or uses of water now
of a higher quality or of a quality suitable for present and potential uses.” 9 Enforcement of the
guidelines was cursory. 10
In 1968, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall endorsed the policy of preventing degradation
of existing clean water resources, 11 but retreated from the absolute protection of existing water
quality reflected in the 1966 guidelines. 12 The Secretary’s policy required maintenance of waters
7

Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
GLICKSMAN, supra note __, at 553.
9
N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean
Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643, 658 (1977) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
INTERSTATE WATERS 5, 7 (1966)).
10
See Mary A. Stitts, Note, The Ever-Changing Balance of Power in Interstate Water Pollution: Do Affected States
Have Anything to Say After Arkansas v. Oklahoma?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 1356 (1993).
11
Lauren Kalisek, The Principle of Antidegradation and Its Place in Texas Water Quality Permitting, 41 TEX.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2010). See also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the
Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1189-90 (1983) [hereinafter Gaba, Federal Supervision]; Michael C.
Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79, 104 (2003).
12
Hines, supra note , at 659.
8
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whose quality was better than established standards unless a state could justify degradation based
on necessary economic or social development. Degradation would not be allowed, however, to
interfere with or injure designated uses then being made or which could be made of those
waters. 13
Despite the weakening of the 1966 guidelines, state governors and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce complained that an anti-degradation policy would unreasonably restrict economic
development, and state enforcement of the guidelines continued to lag. 14 By the time Congress
adopted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (now known as the Clean
Water Act), the water quality standards of all fifty states nominally included versions of an antidegradation policy statement, but in most states, protection against degradation was little more
than an unimplemented objective. 15
The 1972 law said nothing about anti-degradation policy. EPA, which had taken over
control of federal water quality programs, took the position that such a policy was “consistent
with the spirit, intent, and goals of the Act,” especially the goal of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing]
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 16 EPA refined the policy
in 1975, creating the requirements that, with few changes, remain in place today. 17 In 1987,
Congress cryptically addressed anti-degradation of water quality for the first time, providing that
for waters whose quality exceeds levels necessary to protect the designated use, any effluent
limitation based on a total maximum daily load (TMDL) 18 may be revised only if the revision “is
subject to and consistent with the anti-degradation policy established under this section.” 19 The
statute, which still governs anti-degradation policy, simply incorporates by reference EPA’s prior
administrative policy. 20
B. The Structure of the Anti-degradation Program

13

Kalisek, supra note , at 5-6. See 40 Fed. Reg. 55340 (Nov. 28, 1975).
Michael Snyder, Note, Nondegradation of Water Quality: The Need for Effective Action, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
890, 893, 897 (1975).
15
Hines, supra note __, at 659-60.
16
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (emphasis added). See EPA, Questions and Answers on Antidegradation 1 (Aug.
1985)
[hereinafter
Qs
&
As],
available
at
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/upload/2006_12_01_standards_antidegqa.pdf.
17
40 C.F.R. § 131.12. EPA amended the policy in 1983. It created a limited exception for temporary or short-term
changes in water quality in Outstanding National Resource Waters (ONRW), which previously had been protected
from all degradation. John Harleston, What Is Antidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33,
47 (1996). EPA made this change because it “was concerned that waters which properly could have been designated
as ONRW were not so designated because of the flat no degradation provision, and therefore were not being given
special protection.” 48 Fed. Reg. 51402 (Nov. 8, 1983). See also Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal
Lands II: Water Pollution, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 61, 83 (1993); John L. Horwich, Water Quality
Nondegradation in Montana: Is Any Deterioration Too Much?, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 145, 158-60 (1993).
18
A total maximum daily load is the maximum aggregate pollution loading that the receiving water is capable of
assimilating without violating applicable water quality standards by creating excessive pollutant concentrations or
interfering with designated uses. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note at __, at 627.
19
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2006).
20
Jeffrey Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 651, 672 (2004) [hereinafter
Gaba, New Growth].
14

5

An anti-degradation policy is a required component of the water quality standards that
states must adopt and enforce. 21 EPA regulations currently provide that each state must adopt an
anti-degradation policy that includes three elements. 22 First, existing instream uses and the level
of water quality necessary to protect those uses must be maintained and protected—state
standards must be “sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable waters, preventing
their further degradation.” 23 Second, the state must maintain water quality that exceeds levels
necessary to support propagation of fish and wildlife, and water recreation, unless allowing
lower water quality is necessary to accommodate important economic or social development. 24
Even then, water quality standards must fully protect existing uses. In addition, the state must
assure achievement of the highest statutory and regulatory requirements for all point sources and
all cost-effective and reasonable best management practices for nonpoint sources. Third, the
state must maintain quality in high quality waters that constitute an “outstanding National
resource,” including waters of national and state parks and wildlife refuges and waters of
“exceptional recreational or ecological significance.” 25 In short, the policy requires different
levels of protection for three types, or tiers, of waters. 26 Under Tier 1, existing uses must be
maintained in all waters. Under Tier 2, for high-quality waters that exceed fishable/swimmable
quality, degradation will be allowed only if it is necessary to accommodate important social or
economic development in the region. Degradation of water quality is completely prohibited for
Tier 3, Outstanding National Resource Waters (ONRWs), 27 although “temporary and short-term

21

PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1994).
40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a). According to one court, the requirement to adopt an anti-degradation policy does not apply
to CWA permitting programs administered by federal agencies. City of Olmsted Falls v. EPA, 435 F.3d 632, 637
(6th Cir. 2005) (finding anti-degradation policy inapplicable to federal issuance of dredge and fill permits). The
CWA provides, however, that all federal agencies must comply with state water quality standards, including a state’s
anti-degradation policy. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2006); Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th
Cir. 1998).
23
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 705. See also Qs & As, supra note , at 3 (stating that “no activity is
allowable . . . which could partially or completely eliminate any existing use”).
24
40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2). Aside from an unrealistic no discharge goal, the Clean Water Act’s primary goal is to
achieve, wherever attainable, “water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006).
25
40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3).
26
EPA has endorsed the adoption by some states of an additional tier, Tier 2.5, that protects waters to a greater
degree than Tier 2 but not as much as Tier 3. Tier 2.5 waters require “a very high level of water quality protection
without precluding unforeseen future economic and social development considerations.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing Tier 2.5 protection for Lake Michigan) (quoting
Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Standards Handbook § 4.2, at 4-2 (2d ed. 1994)). See also Ohio
Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 773-74 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (approving in part and
disapproving in part West Virginia’s provisions for Tier 2.5). “Because Tier 2.5 is not required by EPA regulations,
the only restriction on [a state’s] Tier 2.5 standards is that they not fall below the minimum standards set for Tier 2.”
Id. at 773.
27
Kalisek, supra note __, at 9. See also Columbus & Franklin Cty. Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042,
1055-56 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to equate degradation of existing water quality with an interference with an existing
use for purposes of application of Ohio’s anti-degradation rules to high quality waters, and rejecting state agency’s
application of a technological approach that limited pollutants to a level consistent with water quality criteria for
exceptional waters because “the analysis proceeds from a false premise that the applicable water quality standard is
determined by the use designation rather than the antidegradation policy”).
22

6

changes” in water quality to accommodate important economic uses are allowed. 28 Thus, the
policy is designed to protect both existing uses and existing water quality, but in different
circumstances. The Tier 1 provisions are directed at protection of existing uses, while the Tier 2
component aims to protect the quality of high quality waters. 29 Tier 3 also focuses on protection
of water quality.
The anti-degradation policy may affect states administering the CWA or discharging
sources in several circumstances. States must review and, if appropriate, revise their water
quality standards at least once every three years. Any such revisions must comply with the antidegradation policy. If a state fails to adopt an adequate anti-degradation policy, EPA must adopt
one for the state. 30 If a state issues a discharge permit for a point source that violates the antidegradation policy, EPA may veto the permit. 31 EPA also may disapprove TMDLs that violate
the policy. 32
In addition, the Act requires those seeking a federal license or permit for an activity that
may result in a discharge (such as operation of a hydropower plant or the filling of wetlands) to
provide a certification that the discharge will comply with state water quality standards.
Without such a certification, the federal agency may not issue the license or permit. 33 Activities
covered by this requirement include discharges requiring a CWA permit in a state in which EPA,
rather than a state, administers the permit program. 34 If a state’s certification for an EPA-issued

28

Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (Nov. 8, 1983); OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA 823-B-94-005, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK: SECOND EDITION 4-10 (2d ed.
1994), http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/handbook/index.cfm.
29
Gaba, Federal Supervision, supra note __, at 1192.
30
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4) (2006). Raymond Proffitt Found v. EPA, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
held that EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to issue a federal anti-degradation program for a state with a deficient
program. Cf. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. EPA, 105 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that district
court improperly dismissed CWA citizen suit alleging that EPA violated nondiscretionary duty to determine whether
state changes to water quality standards violated CWA requirements, including the anti-degradation policy). But cf.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that EPA did not have nondiscretionary
duty to review and evaluate existing state water quality standards retained after a state’s triennial review).
31

33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2006).
Qs & As, supra note __, at 2.
33
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2006). See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding
denial of state certification for natural gas pipeline on ground that backfill discharge would violate state’s antidegradation policy); FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 926 A.2d 1197 (Me. 2007) (dam and
reservoir facilities not exempt from anti-degradation policy); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wash.
2d 778, 51 P.3d 744 (2002) (holding that § 101(g) of the CWA did not preclude state environmental agency from
imposing minimum streamflow requirements in water quality certification on holder of state water rights). But cf.
Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The anti-degradation policy only refers to
water quality standards and does not refer to water withdrawal.”). Federal agencies may have the power to impose
conditions on licensees that are more protective of water quality than a state certification is. See, e.g., Snoqualmie
Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).
34
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). Most states have received EPA approval to administer at least
portions of the Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit program. EPA, State
Program Status, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm.
32

7

discharge permit fails to comply with the anti-degradation policy, EPA may add more stringent
effluent limitations to ensure compliance with the policy. 35
C. The Goals of Anti-degradation Programs
The reasons to mandate the improvement of inferior quality natural resources are
relatively obvious, and include ensuring that exposure to or use of those resources does not
adversely affect public health, destroy critical wildlife or fish populations, or otherwise disrupt
ecosystem functions. By contrast, no single goal explains legal mandates to prevent degradation
of superior quality resources. Instead, anti-degradation programs rest on a variety of rationales,
including the desire to provide a margin of safety to offset the risk that regulations will not
provide the desired level of protection, protect special value natural resources, prevent the
movement of industry to areas with superior environmental quality, prevent interstate pollution,
and preserve opportunities for future economic growth. The federal CWA and Clean Air Act
(CAA), which contain the best known anti-degradation programs among the pollution control
laws, illustrate each of these justifications for preventing degradation of high quality resources. 36
1. Providing a Margin of Safety
The CAA and the CWA both require the adoption of ambient quality standards to provide
a minimally acceptable level of environmental quality. The CAA requires that EPA adopt
primary standards that are requisite to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety
and secondary standards that protect the public welfare from known or anticipated adverse
effects associated with air pollution.37 The CWA requires states to adopt water quality standards
that assure that pollutant concentrations will protect designated uses. 38 Both sets of standards
establish maximum permissible concentrations of pollutants in the air or water.
Environmental regulation often proceeds in the face of scientific uncertainty. As a result,
regulators may determine that a particular concentration level is sufficient to achieve the desired
level of protection, only to discover later that adverse effects occur at lower pollution
concentrations than once believed.
Anti-degradation rules can protect against such
35

Qs & As, supra note __, at 2.
Other federal pollution control laws seek to prevent degradation of existing environmental quality less directly, by
incorporating the anti-degradation regimes established under other laws instead of creating independent
requirements. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 265.193(g)(2)(iii)(D) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulations
requiring EPA, in issuing variances from hazardous waste management requirements, to consider the potential
adverse effects of a release on surface water quality, taking into account water quality standards, including the antidegradation policy, established for surface waters in the area of the affected facility) .
Similarly, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act provides that if
any requirement under a federal law such as the CWA is “legally applicable to” a hazardous substance release or is
“relevant and appropriate under the circumstances of the release,” then the remedial action selected by EPA must
comply with that requirement. At a minimum, the action must attain relevant and appropriate water quality criteria
found in CWA water quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A). For a case holding that a state groundwater antidegradation law was “legally applicable or relevant and appropriate” to a cleanup, but upholding EPA’s implicit
waiver of that law, see U.S. v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.3d 1409, 1445-49 (6th Cir. 1991).
37
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006).
38
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006).
36
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misjudgments about the scope of environmental risk. One of the purposes of the CAA’s
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program is to protect public health “from any
actual or potential adverse effect which in [EPA’s] judgment may reasonably be anticipated to
occur from air pollution . . . notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of all national ambient
air quality standards.” 39
Legislators in 1977 were skeptical of regulators’ ability to identify harmless
concentrations of air pollution, and suspected that the only way to eliminate health risks would
be to set ambient standards at zero. Not willing to go that far, legislative supporters of the PSD
program sought to minimize risk by keeping pollutant concentrations lower than required by air
quality standards in areas that already had clean air. 40 In this way, the program would provide a
“margin of safety” in case pollution actually caused harm at concentrations lower than any
threshold levels identified by EPA or if EPA refused for economic reasons to tighten the
standards despite new evidence that existing standards were not sufficiently protective. 41
Accordingly, anti-degradation requirements create a safety net in the event existing ambient
quality standards are inadequate. 42
2. Protecting High-Value Natural Resources
A second function of anti-degradation constraints is to protect highly valued natural
resources that may be at risk from exposure to pollutant concentrations that are established to
protect public health. Both the CAA and CWA programs seek to promote that goal.
One of the purposes of the CAA’s PSD program is to preserve, protect, and enhance air
quality in national parks, wilderness areas, and other areas of “special” natural, recreational,
scenic, or historic value. 43 Because adverse effects on natural resources may occur at
concentrations lower than those that trigger health risks, the CAA’s welfare-based secondary
standards may be more stringent than the health-based primary standards. 44 Even then,
secondary standards may not be adequate to protect particularly vulnerable resources, or EPA
may have underestimated how clean the air needs to be to protect those resources.
During congressional debate, supporters of the PSD program emphasized the benefits of
protecting parks from air pollution, claiming that preservation of clean air would prevent damage
39

42 U.S.C. § 7470(1) (2006).
David P. Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 77 (1980).
41
See Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 64 (1988) [hereinafter Oren, Control-Compelling]. PSD’s supporters also viewed the program as necessary
because the national standards did not cover certain damaging pollutants such as sulfates that cause acid rain and
failed to account for the synergistic effects of multiple pollutants. Id. at 60, 82.
42
Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of
Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from The Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 742 n.144 (1977)
[hereinafter Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law].
43
42 U.S.C. § 7470(2) (2006). See generally Craig N. Oren, The Protection of Parklands from Increased Air
Pollution: A Look at Current Policy, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1989) [hereinafter Oren, Parklands].
44
DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, Appendix C (2011). In practice, EPA rarely
establishes separate secondary standards. See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note __, at 406.
40
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that would occur even at pollution concentrations allowed by the national ambient air quality
standards. 45 Degradation of air quality in national parks would interfere with scenic vistas in
places like the Grand Canyon and damage unique natural resources, frustrating the opportunities
for preservation, recreation, and spiritual renewal that justified creation of the national parks and
other protected areas. 46 The CWA’s anti-degradation policy serves the same function through its
prohibition on water quality degradation in ONRWs. 47 Enhanced protections are particularly
critical if resource damage is expected to be irreversible or would interfere with the broader
functioning of critical ecosystem services. 48
3. Preventing the Development of Pollution Havens
Without a nondegradation policy, areas with relatively clean air or water quality would
have a greater capacity to assimilate pollution without violating applicable ambient standards
than would more polluted areas. Under both the CAA and the CWA, pollution control
requirements tend to be most stringent in highly polluted areas that are in violation of ambient
quality standards. The CAA imposes rigorous controls on pollution sources in nonattainment
areas, 49 and the stringency of the controls tends to increase in relation to the degree of
noncompliance. 50 Under the CWA, states whose waters are more polluted than state water
quality standards allow must establish TMDLs that represent aggregate limitations on discharges
into those impaired waters. 51 Absent nondegradation programs, new industrial sources with
choices about where to locate (putting other factors aside) would tend to choose areas with less
stringent pollution controls to reduce costs of operation. 52 The result would be not only
degradation of existing good environmental quality, but also an exodus of business from
industrialized areas to more remote, cleaner areas.
Anti-degradation provisions can prevent “pollution havens” by removing incentives that
would drive industry to clean areas if they were allowed to deteriorate to minimal levels required
by ambient standards. These provisions address a classic prisoner’s dilemma because states with
high air or water quality would bear most of the costs of maintaining it, while recouping only a
small portion of the benefits. 53 “Each state, fearing undercutting by a state competing for
economic development, would be reluctant to adopt a potentially disabling policy absent some
assurance about what other states intended to do. All states would thus be paralyzed to act.”54
45

Oren, Parklands, supra note __, at 329.
Id. at 315, 346-47.
47
See supra notes __ - __ and accompanying text.
48
See, e.g., ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS
LATER 200 (1993) (noting that headwater tributaries of larger watersheds can “provide clean base flow and critical
spawning and rearing habitat to support downstream flows”).
49
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (2006) (listing requirements for SIPs that cover nonattainment areas).
50
See, e.g., id. § 7511a (requirements for ozone nonattainment areas).
51
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).
52
See Snyder, supra note __, at 891-92 (recommending maintenance of “the essential complementary relation
between abatement and nondegradation”).
53
Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note __, at 747.
54
Hines, supra note 21, at 654. See also Stewart, supra note __, at 747 (noting the usefulness of anti-degradation
requirements in addressing the “commons’ dilemma” by forcing states “to adopt policies which they would
voluntarily select in the absence of transaction costs precluding common agreement”).
46
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The CAA’s PSD program was designed to neutralize the attractiveness to industry of areas with
superior air quality. 55 The CWA’s anti-degradation policy serves a similar function. 56
.
4. Preventing Interstate Pollution
The CAA’s PSD program also sought to prevent activities in one state from harming
other states by preventing areas from becoming “‘dumping grounds’ for the pollution caused by
industrial sources in other regions.” 57 The argument was apparently persuasive. One of the
goals of the program is “to assure that emissions from any sources in any State will not interfere
with any portion of the applicable implementation program to prevent significant deterioration of
air quality for any other State.” 58
A dispute between Arkansas and Oklahoma illustrates the potential for the CWA’s antidegradation policy to constrain interstate water pollution. The city of Fayetteville, Arkansas
applied for a permit from EPA that would allow its new municipal wastewater treatment plant to
discharge treated wastewater into a tributary of the Illinois River about forty miles upstream
from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border. Oklahoma protested, arguing to EPA that the discharge
would impair a portion of the River it had designated as a Tier 3 scenic river. 59 EPA issued the
permit anyway, finding that the discharge would not result in an actual, detectable violation of
Oklahoma’s water quality standards. 60 Responding to Oklahoma’s challenge to the permit, the
Supreme Court deferred to EPA’s determination that both the CWA and EPA’s own
regulations 61 authorize EPA to ensure that a discharge not violate downstream water quality
standards. 62 However, the Court affirmed EPA’s finding that the treatment plant’s discharge
would not cause an actual, detectable violation of the Oklahoma standards. 63 Indeed, the Court
concluded that it was not arbitrary for EPA to base issuance of the permit partly on the benefits
to the River resulting from the increased flow of relatively clean water from the new plant.64
The Court’s decision endorsed EPA’s view that the CWA bars interstate pollution that causes
55

See Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note __, at 105, 111 (attributing the passage of the PSD program in 1977 to
an effort by industrialized states to limit economic growth in the Sunbelt). Distributional considerations may cut
against the adoption of an anti-degradation policy, too. According to Richard Stewart, a nondegradation policy
“would inhibit economic development in areas with considerable poverty and unemployment, while the benefits
would accrue in large measure to the wealthy who can afford to visit scenic areas of exceptionally high
environmental quality or who are more likely to derive psychic satisfaction from their preservation.” Stewart,
Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note __, at 750.
56
Cf. Bonnie A. Malloy, Testing Cooperative Federalism: Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 6
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 63, 85 (2011) (noting that “lower standards would be more likely to attract
industry”).
57
Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note __, at 85.
58
42 U.S.C. § 7470(4) (2006).
59
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 95 (1992).
60
Id. at 97.
61
40 C.F.R. § 122.4. That section continues to preclude EPA from issuing a discharge permit “[w]hen the
imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected
States.”
62
Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 105-07. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the CWA requires EPA to
protect water quality in a downstream state from an upstream discharge in another state.
63
Id. at 111-12.
64
Id. at 114.
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water quality standard violations, including violations of the anti-degradation policy, although in
practice the standard of proof linking an upstream discharge with a downstream water quality
violation may be difficult to meet. 65
5. Balancing Environmental Protection Goals and Economic Growth
Opportunities
Anti-degradation programs seek to balance protection of existing clean air and water
quality and continued economic growth. A goal of the CAA’s PSD program is to “insure that
economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air
resources.” 66 Under the CWA’s policy, degradation of Tier 2 waters is allowed if necessary to
accommodate important social and economic development.
Under this approach,
“nondegradation policy does not make existing resource quality an absolute minimum.” 67 The
result is “a flexible, site-specific consideration of the economic justifications and social need for
water quality degradation in light of available alternatives and the significance of the predicted
degradation.” 68
Anti-degradation policies can be a vehicle for promoting efficient resource allocation.
Degradation is allowed if the value of the economic development that causes it exceeds the
resulting marginal decline in the value of the degraded resource. Anti-degradation advocates
have even couched these programs as job creators, which create opportunities for new sources by
requiring tighter source controls and low ambient concentrations in clean areas. 69 An antidegradation program also may serve as a temporary device to postpone exploitation of good
environmental quality until the potential for economic growth justifies the resulting degradation.
By one account, some PSD supporters apparently held this view. 70 This argument for
postponing exploitation “draws from the conservationist, rather than the preservationist, roots of
the environmental movement” 71 in that the former supported management of natural resource use
to maximize economic return over time. 72
65

For criticism of the standard of proof (i.e., that an upstream source is causing an actual, detectable violation of
another state’s water quality standards) endorsed by the Court, see Robert L. Glicksman, Watching the River Flow:
The Prospects for Improved Interstate Water Pollution Control, 43 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 119 (1993).
66
42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (2006).
67
Hines, supra note __, at 645.
68
Mark C. Van Putten, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 863, 899 (1986). EPA’s failure
to define important economic and social development has given states broad discretion to endorse degradation of
Tier 2 waters, as long as existing uses are not prevented or state water quality standards otherwise violated. See
ADLER ET AL., supra note , at 202; infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
69
Oren, Control Compelling, supra note , at 97.
70
Id. at 101. “Representative Waxman, for instance, urged that the program ought to be adopted as a means to
control the growth of clean air areas so that there would be room for future industrial growth; this statement perhaps
implies a desire to use PSD to keep some clean air for later appropriation.” Id.
71
Id. (“[A] conservationist argument for maintaining clean air better than the air quality standards could hold that
some restrictions on development now are necessary to assure that future exploitation opportunities are not
sacrificed.”).
72
See Hines, supra note __, at 646 (noting that “the idea of nondegradation seems to be closely related to large
principles of conservation”). These conservation principles are similarly expressed in the sustained yield provisions
of the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)
described in Part IV.A.5, infra.
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III.

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S ANTI-DEGRADATION
PROGRAM

The success of anti-degradation programs in preventing deterioration of high quality
water bodies varies widely from state to state. Although the anti-degradation policy is intended
to protect high quality waters, it is by no means a precise set of instructions to the states. 73 EPA
interprets its role in the enforcement of anti-degradation policies as a passive one. 74 It may
disapprove and promulgate all or part of an implementation process for anti-degradation if, in the
judgment of the Administrator, the state’s process (or certain provisions thereof) circumvents the
intent and purpose of the federal anti-degradation policy. 75 However, EPA rarely does so.76
EPA’s proclivity for leaving the policy vague, and for affording broad discretion to the states,
has precluded the development of a consistent national anti-degradation policy. 77 As a result,
critics describe the policy as “at best, obscure,” and lacking in substantive content. 78
The states’ designation criteria and processes vary tremendously. Moreover, when water
bodies do get designated, the states’ implementation of permitting authorities does not always
ensure against degradation of those water bodies. This part reviews the nation’s experiences
with the designation of high quality waters and with the subsequent implementation of protective
measures for, and permitting decisions in, those waters. It concludes with an assessment of the
antidegradation policy’s deficiencies.
A. State Designation Variations
The designation process for Tier 1 through 3 waters “varies enormously” from state to
state. 79 EPA’s anti-degradation policy does not provide adequate guidance on how to distinguish
between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters. 80 Likewise, EPA’s definition of Tier 3 (Outstanding National

73

Harleston, supra note __, at, 52-53 (“In its almost thirty years of existence, few details of implementing
antidegradation have been expressed.”).
74
National Resources Defense Council, Effective Environmental Compliance and Governance: Perspectives from
the Natural Resources Defense Council (2010), http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10051901a.pdf.
75
EPA, Water Quality Handbook- Chapter 4. Antidegradation (Aug. 15, 1994), available at
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/handbook/chapter04.cfm#section8 (visited Feb. 4, 2012).
76
See National Resources Defense Council, Effective Environmental Compliance and Governance: Perspectives
from the Natural Resources Defense Council (2010), http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10051901a.pdf
(noting that EPA could serve an important catalyst in defining minimum standards, but that it must work more
closely with the states to ensure compliance with the laws).
77
Id. at 77.
78
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 409, 454 (2007) [hereinafter Gaba, General Permits]. See also Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to
Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 292 (1999) (“the current [CWA
anti-degradation] program . . . is so vague as to defy clear explanation”).
79
River Network: Implementing the Clean Water Act in the Intermountain West: An Overview; Chapter 2: Water
Quality Standards: Antidegradation (2010), available at http://www.rivernetwork.org/sites/default/files/chapter2.pdf.
80
40 C.F.R. 131.12(a); Gaba, General Permits, supra note ___, at 454. See Gaba, New Growth, supra note __, at
675 (“Unfortunately, the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters may, in many cases, be more metaphysical
than biological.”); Kalisek, supra note __, at 10-11 (stating that the states have struggled with how to identify Tier 2
high-quality waters).
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Resource Waters) is unclear. 81 Some state regulations provide no information whatsoever on
how a waterbody might be nominated or how a designation decision might be made, leaving
protection of the highest quality waters at risk. 82 “Designation policies in many states are so
vague as to be hard for a concerned citizen or watershed group to use … or even to understand
how they could use them.” 83 As a result, courts tend to defer to the agencies’ designation
decisions unless there is no evidence whatsoever to support them. 84
Criteria and processes for distinguishing between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters are especially
opaque. In Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit addressed a series of
challenges to Kentucky’s anti-degradation policy. 85 The court deferred to EPA’s view that its
own regulations permitted either a pollutant-by-pollutant or water body-by-water body approach
to determining which waters merit Tier 2 protection. 86 It also allowed automatic exclusion of
impaired waters from Tier 2, 87 and found that a state’s program complies with the antidegradation policy as long as all waters whose quality exceeds fishable/swimmable water quality
are afforded Tier 2 protection. 88 According to the court, neither the CWA nor EPA regulations
require that a minimum percentage of a state’s waters be afforded Tier 2 protection.
In contrast, in West Virginia, a district court invalidated EPA’s approval of the state’s
anti-degradation program for deficiencies in both designation and implementation. 89 With
regard to designation, the court rejected the state’s classification of segments of the Kanawha
and Monongahela Rivers as Tier 1 waters. The absence of evidence about the water quality of
those rivers failed to support denying them the more stringent protection of Tier 2. 90 The court
also invalidated EPA’s approval of a provision that failed to require Tier 2 protection in all cases
where the water segment supported minimum fishable/swimmable uses and had assimilative
capacity remaining for some parameters. 91
With respect to the most protective category—Tier 3 ONRWs—some states have no
regulations regarding processes or criteria for making designation decisions. 92 Perhaps not

81

40 C.F.R. 131.12(a)(3). See John A. Chilson, Keeping Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water Act’s
Antidegradation Policy Work, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 545, 553-55 (1999).
82
River Network, supra note __, at 51. [Is this the correct citation?] See, e.g., Am. Littoral Soc’y v. EPA, 199 F.
Supp. 2d 217 (D,N.J. 2002) (rejecting challenge to state’s failure to designate any waters to be protected by antidegradation policy because the plaintiffs failed to identify any waters requiring protection).
83
River Network, supra note __, at 50, available at http://www.rivernetwork.org/sites/default/files/chapter3.pdf.
84
See, e.g., Petition of Town of Sherburne, 154 Vt. 596, 581 A.2d 274 (1990) (upholding downgrading of waters to
accommodate proposed sewage disposal facility).
85
Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2008).
86
Id. at 475-77.
87
Id. at 477-81.
88
Id. at 481.
89
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
90
Id. at 737. The court ruled that EPA regulations permit classification of waters as Tier 1 or Tier 2 based on a
water body-by-water body approach, without having to make classifications for each pollutant. Id. at 747-48. But
the record contained no evidence to justify classifying the rivers as Tier 1, other than their appearance on the list of
impaired waters. Id. at 750.
91
Id. at 765-66.
92
River Network, supra note __ at 51.
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surprisingly, then, some states have no ONRWs within their boundaries. 93 EPA regulations
include as examples of ONRWs “waters of National and State parks and wildlife refuges and
waters of exceptional recreational or ecological significance.” 94 But these waters are not covered
unless a state takes affirmative steps to designate them. Absent explicit state designations, courts
have refused to recognize ONRWs at the behest of citizens’ groups. 95
A few states do in fact use the ONRW designation to protect wilderness waters and
critical habitat, in addition to parks, refuges, and other unique water bodies. 96 Montana
automatically designates all “surface waters located wholly within the boundaries of designated
national parks or wilderness areas.” 97 Florida’s ONRW program includes parks, refuges,
wilderness areas, memorials, and waters of special recreational or ecological significance. 98
Colorado includes water bodies that constitute “a significant attribute” of wilderness areas. 99 In
Washington, however, to be eligible as ONRWs, water bodies within wilderness areas must be
“relatively pristine” or possess exceptional water quality. 100
New Mexico’s experience might serve as an example of how efforts to designate and
protect ONRWs can work fairly well. In 2010, the New Mexico Water Quality Control
Commission adopted an across-the-board rule designating all perennial surface waters in Forest
Service wilderness areas as ONRWs. 101 Prior to the rule, there were only two ONRWs in New
Mexico—the Rio Santa Barbara in the Pecos Wilderness and the waters of the Valle Vidal in the
Carson National Forest. 102 The new designation covers 700 miles of 195 perennial rivers and

93

Judith M. Brawer, Antidegradation Policy and Outstanding National Resource Waters in the Northern Rocky
Mountain States, 20 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 13, 21 (1999). See 63 Fed. Reg. 36742, 36786
(characterizing the designation of ONRWs as limited, although some states have designated a high percentage of
their waters as ONRWs).
94
40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3); see Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in
Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 716–20 (1995) (describing the implications of ONRW designation on
diversions of water from tributaries to Mono Lake for use in Los Angeles).
95
See, e.g., Save the Lake v. Schregardus, 141 Ohio App. 3d 530, 752 N.E.2d 295 (2001) (refusing to treat waters
within a state park as automatically entitled to ONRW status).
96
See C. Mark Hersh, The Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy and Its Role in Watershed Protection in
Washington State, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 217, 222–29 (2009); Brawer, supra note , at 20–27
(discussing designation of ONRWs in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming).
97
MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.30.617(1) (2006).
98
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 62-302.700(2).
99
5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-31:31.8(2)(a)(ii)(A) (2007); see id. § 1002-31:31.28(C)(3) (explaining that ONRW
designations apply in wilderness areas despite the fact the wilderness areas already have other types of protections in
place; to conclude otherwise “would prevent application of the outstanding waters designation to waters that may be
among those most deserving of protection”).
100
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-330(1)(a).
101
20.6.4.8.A(3) NMAC (2009); 20.6.4.8.A(3)-(4) NMAC (2011). See Petition Protects Headwater Streams in
Wilderness Areas of New Mexico (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/OOTS/documents/PRONRWPassesFinal-12-1-10.pdf; N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.4.9.B, D (LexisNexis 2011) (providing criteria for ONRW
designation). Two other states in the intermountain west—Utah and Wyoming—have designated all waters within
large geographic areas such as National Forests or Wilderness Areas as ONRWs. River Network, supra note __, at
50.
102
Jan. 19, 2012 email from Erik Schlenker-Goodrich, Western Environmental Law Center, Taos, NM.
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streams, 29 lakes, and 1405 wetlands in 12 wilderness areas. 103 According to the New Mexico
Environment Department, “[t]hese waters represent the State’s most valuable headwater streams.
Protection of these headwaters will help maintain a clean water supply for uses in Wilderness
and for downstream uses by municipalities, agriculture, and recreational interests, and will help
maintain healthy ecosystems, preserve habitat, and protect vulnerable and endangered
species.” 104 To protect ONRWs, the new rule prohibits new or increased point source discharges
that would adversely impact water quality and requires best management practices (BMPs) for
nonpoint sources. 105 It provides that, “[e]xcept for pre-existing land-use activities (that comply
with BMPs), water quality cannot be degraded in ONRWs.” 106
Ironically, some of the newly designated ONRWs are on the section 303(d) “impaired
waters” list. 107 The ONRW designation may stimulate restoration efforts on these waters.
According to a representative of the Coalition for the Valle Vidal, the Valle Vidal is a good
example of how ONRWs receive a fair amount of attention for restoration work. 108 A long
history of grazing, mining, and logging left the some of the Valle Vidal tributaries in a “highly
degraded state.” 109 Ongoing restoration efforts include relatively inexpensive, yet effective, lowtech restoration projects like fencing, erosion control structures made of rock and vegetation, and
road drainage devices that direct runoff into vegetative buffer zones. 110
Environmental groups applauded the state’s efforts to protect ONRWs. 111 But the New
Mexico Cattle Growers Association petitioned to set aside the new rule, 112 and urged the
Commission to designate smaller watersheds on a case-by-case basis rather than in one blanket

103

Order and Statement of Reasons, ¶ 7–8, In re Petition to Nominate Surface Waters in Forest Service Wilderness
Areas as Outstanding National Resource Waters, WQCC 10-01(R) (Water Quality Control Comm’n Dec. 2010),
available at ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/www/HearingOfficer/ONRW/WQCCOrder+SOR20.6.4NMAC.pdf.
104
Press Release, Office of the Sec’y, supra note .
105
NMDEQ,
Antidegradation
Policy
Implementation
Procedure
17
(2010),
ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/www/swqb/CPP/2010/CPP-AppendixA.pdf.
106
NMDEQ, Guidance for Nonpoint Source Discharges in Outstanding National Resource Waters G-1 (2009),
ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/www/swqb/WPS/NPSPlan/2009NPSPlan-AppendixG11-30-10.pdf.
107
Email from Schlenker-Goodrich, supra note.
108
Id.
109
Comanche Creek, Valle Vidal Unit, Carson National Forest (2005), http://www.comanchecreek.org/.
110
Comanche Creek, Restoration Practices (2005), http://comanchecreek.org/Restoration_Practices/index.html.
Restoration goals are “to meet current water quality standards; restore hydrologic function to the creek and its
tributaries; and maximize habitat for the Rio Grande cutthroat trout.” Id.
111
Susan Montoya Bryan, NM Regulators Approve Outstanding Waters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2010,
available at ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/www/swqb/News/AP12-01-2010Article.pdf. For background, see Amigos
Bravos, Overview of ONRW Protections and History in New Mexico (2012), http://amigosbravos.org/onrw.php.
112
New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Ass'n v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, Ct. App. No. 31,191. See Staci Matlock,
New Rule Under Fire from N.M. Cattle Growers Association, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Jan. 10, 2011,
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/outstanding-waters-New-rule-under-fire-from-cattle-growers (last
visited Nov. 23, 2011).
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rule. 113 Despite the pressure, the Commission is going forward with the implementation of the
new ONRW rule. 114
B. State Implementation Variations
EPA regulations require that state water quality standards “identify the methods for
implementing” the anti-degradation policy. 115 In some instances, litigants have leveled facial
attacks on entire state programs or significant components of those programs, while in others
they have identified more discrete actions, such as the issuance of permits, alleged to be in
violation of the anti-degradation policy. The judicial treatment of these challenges has been
inconsistent, but one theme emerges: a state anti-degradation program that is little more than an
empty shell is vulnerable to attack.
1. Programmatic Attacks
In Kentucky Waterways Alliance, the Sixth Circuit took issue with Kentucky’s decision to
exempt five categories of discharges from the requirement that new or expanded discharges into
high quality waters pass Tier 2 review. 116 The plaintiffs charged that the exemptions
“eviscerate[d] Kentucky’s Tier [2] review process, allowing significant degradations in water
quality without demonstrated necessity.” 117 The court reasoned that because EPA’s antidegradation regulations protect assimilative capacity, EPA’s task was to focus on how much
assimilative capacity would be lost under the exemptions, and in particular whether that loss
would be significant or merely de minimis. 118 Instead of assessing the exemptions’ cumulative
effects, EPA measured Kentucky’s compliance by assessing whether each individual exemption
resulted in “significant” or “insignificant” degradation of assimilative capacity. The court
therefore lacked an adequate factual record for determining whether the exemptions together
permitted significant degradation, and it remanded to EPA for further analysis. 119
113

See Brief of NMCGA, In the Matter of Petition to Nominate Surface Waters in Forest Service Wilderness as
Outstanding National Resource Waters, Appeal from Water Quality Control Commission, WQCC Case No. 1001(R), Ct. App. No. 31,191 (Aug. 22, 2011).
114
See Surface Water Quality Bureau, N.M. Env’t Dep’t, Water Quality Standards: Outstanding National Resource
Waters, http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/swqb/ONRW/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2012). The case is still pending. Email
from Schlenker-Goodrich, supra note .
115
40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a).
116
Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2008). The five categories included any
expanded discharge under a renewed or modified state permit, so long as the expansion did not increase pollutant
loading by 20% or more. Id. at 491. See supra notes ___-___ (describing court’s deference to EPA’s approval of
Kentucky’s exclusion of certain waters from Tier 2 designation).
117
Id. at 492.
118
Id. “[A]ssimilative capacity is a measurement of the amount by which . . . quality exceeds levels necessary to
support fish, wildlife, and recreation.” Id. at 484. According to EPA, “the central purpose of the federal Tier II
antidegradation regulations is to protect a water body's assimilative capacity, which is ‘the difference between the
applicable water quality criterion for a pollutant parameter and the ambient water quality for that parameter when it
is better that the criterion.’” Id. (citing Memorandum from Ephraim S. King, Director of EPA Office of Science and
Technology, to Water Management Division Directors (Aug. 10, 2005); Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63
Fed. Reg. at 36,783).
119
Id. at 492-93. Cf. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. 279 F. Supp. 2d at 770-73 (invalidating EPA’s approval of a
provision deeming degradation to be significant if the proposed activity, together with all other activities allowed
after the baseline water quality is established, resulted in a reduction of a water segment’s available assimilative
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Similarly, the West Virginia district court chastised EPA for ignoring the plain meaning
of the state regulations in approving provisions allowing new or expanded discharges from
wastewater treatment plants to evade Tier 2 review if the discharge resulted in a net decrease in
the overall pollutant loading. 120 According to the court, EPA’s approval in effect rewrote the
provision to apply only when there is a net decrease in the pollutant loading for each pollutant
parameter. 121
EPA’s lack of vigilance in overseeing state compliance with the anti-degradation policy
was also reflected in its approval of an egregiously deficient implementation plan in Oregon. 122
The plan contained only one sentence providing that the state’s entire body of water quality
standards was “intended to implement the Antidegradation Policy.” 123 The court held that EPA
erred in approving a policy that failed to identify “even a semblance of an implementation plan,”
in clear violation of its own regulation. 124 Subsequently, when EPA approved Oregon’s revised
implementation plan, its decision was remanded once again because the plan failed to specify a
method to identify and protect existing uses. 125 The court rejected EPA’s argument that the
CWA does not specify a minimum method for implementing anti-degradation policies but
simply requires that states “identify methods for their implementation.” 126 It concluded that EPA
must review the state’s entire implementation plan to ensure that it describes all of the required
elements and does not circumvent the purpose of the anti-degradation policy. 127 On the other
hand, the court deferred to EPA’s determination that a provision that applied to “recognized
beneficial uses” protected all “existing uses” from becoming “unacceptably threatened or
impaired.” 128 It also upheld EPA’s interpretation of Oregon’s use of the term “unacceptably” as
allowing only de minimis threats or impairments to existing uses, but noted that “Oregon’s

capacity of 20% or more for parameters of concern because EPA failed to explain why a 20% reduction in
assimilative capacity should be considered insignificant); Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus, 86 Ohio Misc. 2d
78, 685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1997) (holding that state law allowing agency to approve lowering of stream’s
water quality by as much as 80% of its assimilative capacity without anti-degradation review to be inconsistent with
the CWA).
120
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 737-38, 752-57. See supra notes ___-___ (describing court’s
invalidation of Tier 1 designations).
121
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 737-38, 752-57. The court upheld EPA’s approval of other aspects
of the program. It held that EPA properly approved the state’s partial exemption of existing permitted uses from
Tier 2 review, a provision allowing for a de minimis 10% reduction in the available assimilative capacity of Tier 2
waters before Tier 2 review is required, and provisions allowing water quality trades without triggering antidegradation review. Id. at 751-52, 767-70, 774-76. f upheld
122
Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Or. 2003).
123
Id. at 1264-65 (quoting OAR 340–041–0026(1)(a)).
124
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)). See also CORAlations v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 2d 413 (D.P.R. 2007)
(overturning EPA’s approval of water quality standards that lacked any methods or procedures to apply Puerto
Rico’s anti-degradation policy to wetlands).
125
Northwest Envtl. Advocates, No. 3:05–cv–01876–AC, 2012 WL 653757 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2012)
126
Id. at *19.
127
Id. at *19. EPA argued that, although states are required to identify methods for implementing their
antidegradation policy, those methods need not be contained in the state's regulation.
128
Id. at *18 (citing PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994)). EPA
interpreted this provision as disallowing “both unacceptable threats to uses and actual use impairment.” Id.
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program must, at a minimum, not allow activities that could partially or completely eliminate any
existing uses.” 129
Some of the most significant programmatic challenges have involved nonpoint source
pollution. Judicial reactions to these challenges have been mixed. When Montana’s legislature
exempted nonpoint sources and other so-called “non-significant” activities from anti-degradation
review, 130 EPA directed the state to revise its program to protect the water quality of ONRWs
from “even non-significant, permanent changes in water quality.” 131 In American Wildlands v.
Browner, EPA approved Montana’s subsequent proposal, which extended the anti-degradation
program to all point sources but continued to exempt nonpoint sources (and mixing zones) from
its requirements. 132 In particular, Montana’s new provision exempted nonpoint sources from the
anti-degradation requirements for Tier 2 waters “when reasonable land, soil, and water
conservation practices are applied and existing and anticipated beneficial uses will be fully
protected.” 133 The Tenth Circuit deferred to EPA’s approval on the grounds that the CWA does
not authorize EPA to regulate nonpoint source discharges. 134
Conversely, in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA, the court was unmoved by
EPA’s assertion that it lacked authority to “review and potentially disapprove Oregon’s nonpoint
source provisions as a part of its water quality standards review.” 135 The court rejected
American Wildlands, explaining that “many temperature impaired waters in Oregon are impaired
in whole or in part by nonpoint sources of pollution, [thus] the challenged provisions could
present a considerable obstacle to the attainment of water quality standards when, by law, the
sources of pollution are deemed to be in compliance with water quality standards.” 136 The court
noted that one function of water quality standards is to achieve federally-approved water quality
goals through both state controls and “federal strategies other than point-source technologybased limitations,” and that “[t]his purpose pertains to waters impaired by both point and
nonpoint sources of pollution.” 137
129

Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-201(1)(c), 2-3-103 (1997).
131
Brawer, supra note , at 23-24, citing Region VIII EPA letter to Governor Marc Racicot, pp 3-5 (Dec. 1998)).
132
American Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2000), aff’d, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001).
133
American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5317(2)(b)). This exemption did not apply to ONRWs.
134
Id. at 1198. See also Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 415 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) (“the CWA does not
require states to take regulatory action to limit the amount of non-point water pollution introduced into waterways”).
But cf. Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999) (finding that a state statute
exempting a gold mine’s discharges of arsenic-laced water into rivers that provided habitat for endangered species
from the anti-degradation review process violated the state’s constitutional provision guaranteeing its citizens a right
to a clean and healthy environment).
135
No. 3:05–cv–01876–AC, 2012 WL 653757, at *9-10 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2012). Plaintiffs challenged several
regulations that essentially exempted various nonpoint sources of heat pollution from complying with water quality
standards from antidegradation review “so long as they do not increase in frequency, intensity, duration, or
geographical extent.” Id. at *6.
136
Id. at *7.
137
Id. at * 10 (citing Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002)). Pronsolino paved the way for this
decision by finding that EPA's TMDL regulations “focused on the attainment of water quality standards regardless
of the source of the pollution.” Id. at *9 (emphasis added). Disputes have arisen over the applicability of state antidegradation programs to other activities or over the kinds of waters covered. See, e.g., W. Va. Coal Ass’n v. Reilly,
728 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. W. Va. 1989), aff’d, 932 F.3d 964 (Table), 33 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353 (4th Cir.
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2. As Applied Challenges to Tier I and II Waters Issues
Other judicial challenges have focused on more discrete aspects of state anti-degradation
provisions applicable to one or more of the three tiers of waters. In some of these “as applied”
cases, judicial interpretation has watered down anti-degradation requirements, such as in a pair
of North Dakota cases involving approval of permits allowing phosphorous discharges into high
quality waters because of the purported economic and social importance of the discharging
activities. 138
In other cases, the anti-degradation policy has constrained the issuance of discharge
permits. 139 Most commonly, courts have rejected permits for discharges into Tier 2 waters
because of the absence of any finding of necessary economic or social development. 140
Permitting decisions that blatantly ignore the need to justify degradation of Tier 2 waters, then,
are likely to be more vulnerable than decisions purporting to rest on a finding of necessity.
One court’s rejection of an environmental group’s attack on a state anti-degradation
program regulation highlights the difficulty of reversing findings that economic necessity for
degradation exists. 141 The court upheld a regulation allowing a permit applicant to meet its
obligation to provide “alternatives” to discharges into Tier 2 waters simply by showing that the
project’s costs did not exceed a threshold for annualized costs. The court characterized the rule
as “a compromise between environmental and broader economic concerns [that] the judiciary

1991) (upholding EPA’s authority to object to state’s issuance of permit to coal mining operation that would involve
use of streams for waste assimilation and treatment, in violation of the anti-degradation policy).
138
See People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 697 N.W.2d 319, 330-31(N.D. 2005)
(upholding outlet permit for discharge into category 1 lake because the addition of phosphorus would not alter the
beneficial use of waters, the agency adequately considered other, less degrading alternatives, and the agency
determined that the outlet was part of a project designed to accommodate social and economic factors in the affected
regions); People to Save Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 744 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 2008) (upholding
modification of permit for lake outlet because it would not cause concentration of any parameter of concern to
increase by more than 15%). See also Community Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t v. State, Dep’t of Ecology, 149
Wash. App. 830, 205 P.3d 950 (2009) (upholding general permit for confined animal feeding operations that
required soil but not groundwater monitoring).
139
See, e.g., Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 609 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. 2004) (invalidating issuance of a permit to a
wastewater treatment plant because, even though the administrative law judge appropriately found the requisite
necessity, the permit failed to meet the state anti-degradation policy’s requirement that the county use the best
practicable treatment technology).
140
See, e.g., Ill. EPA v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 386 Ill. App. 375, 896 N.E. 2d 479 (2008) (finding that the
permitting agency’s record lacked data showing that the increased discharge was unavoidable or necessary, did not
discuss other feasible alternatives that might have negated the necessity of the increased discharge, and did not
contain information regarding the possibility of other methods to eliminate or reduce phosphorus and/or nitrogen
before discharging wastewater into stream); In re Ciba-Geigy Corp., 120 N.J. 164, 576 A.2d 784 (N.J. 1990)
(upholding challenge to permit due to absence of any finding of necessity); Fowl River Prot. Ass’n v. Bd. of Water
and Sewer Comm’rs of the City of Mobile, 572 So.2d 446 (Ala. 1990) (invalidating permit for discharge of sewage
due to lack of necessity finding). See also Columbus & Franklin Cty. Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042,
1057-59 (Ohio 1992) (concluding that a state agency acted arbitrarily in deciding that degradation of water quality in
a creek was “necessary to accommodate important economic or social development”).
141
Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 922 So.2d 101 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
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should be loath to disturb.” 142 The court reasoned that the state permitting agency needed the
discretion to decide whether, at some level, the needs of the state’s people would be better served
by placing upper limits on the costs of industrial plants than by “requiring massive and
inefficient expenditures in order to achieve marginal improvements in water quality.” 143
In another case reflecting the anti-degradation policy’s potential to constrain discharges, a
Montana agency declined to apply the state’s anti-degradation policy to discharges from a mine
adit based on a regulation exempting “nonsignificant” discharges into Tier 2 waters. 144 Had the
policy applied, the discharges would have been subject to significantly more stringent controls
and the process for reviewing the mine’s permit application would have entailed more public
scrutiny. 145 The Montana Supreme Court held that the agency’s unsupported statement that a
perpetual discharge from the adit would always be sufficiently treated did not justify its
determination that the discharge would be “nonsignificant.” 146
The same court upheld the state agency’s identification of two parameters for the purpose
of making “nonsignificance” determinations, triggering the application of anti-degradation
review to the discharge of coalbed methane produced waters. 147 A federal district court,
however, subsequently remanded EPA’s approval of the state rules adopting numerical standards
for the two parameters because EPA failed to consider industry’s concerns about the lack of
scientific support for the standards. 148 In critiquing EPA’s explanation that the two parameters
“may” be harmful, the court spuriously concluded, without any supporting rationale or citations,
that “[a]pproving a state standard on the basis that a parameter may be harmful is certainly not
what the Clean Water Act envisioned.” 149 The court failed to recognize that the CWA reflects
Congress’s intent to protect water quality against threats of uncertain magnitude, requiring, for
example, that total maximum daily loads include “a margin of safety which takes into account
‘any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water
quality.” 150
These cases indicate that, once a properly adopted state anti-degradation program is in
place, states have considerable discretion to accommodate discharges into Tier 1 and 2 waters to
promote economic and social goals, provided they comply with regulatory procedures and
supply some evidentiary support for their substantive determinations.
3. As Applied Challenges to Tier III Waters Issues
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Id. at 114.
Id.
144
Clark Fork Coal. v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Qual., 197 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2008).
145
Id. at 489.
146
Id. at 493. See also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 234 P.3d 51 (Mont. 2010)
(invalidating permits to coalbed methane production operation that authorized discharge into high quality waters of
millions of pounds of sodium each year, even though high salinity levels already had impaired the river).
147
Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Envtl. Review, 199 P.3d 191 (Mont. 2008).
148
Pennaco Energy, Inc. v.EPA, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1313 (D. Mont. 2009).
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Id. at 1314.
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33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2006).
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Courts have been somewhat less deferential in reviewing permitting decisions that impact
Tier 3 waters (ONRWs), at least when it comes to new or expanded uses with clear impacts on
water quality. In League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the court held
that the Agency arbitrarily allowed additional mooring buoys, piers, and other forms of
development in its shoreline ordinances. 151 The ordinances would have allowed increased motor
boating, which in turn would cause increased pollutant discharges and runoff into the Lake,
which California had classified as an ONRW. 152 Although the Agency proposed mitigation
measures, including “no wake” zones, speed limits, and user fees, the court found that its
determination that there would be no significant water quality impacts was arbitrary. 153
Along the same lines, a Minnesota court set aside a permit allowing a city to triple the
capacity of a wastewater treatment plant and discharge nearly two million gallons of waste each
day into an ONRW river. 154 The state’s anti-degradation rules prohibited any new or expanded
discharges into an ONRW unless there was no prudent and feasible alternative, and then only “to
the extent necessary to preserve the existing high quality” of the receiving water. 155 The court
held that the state permitting agency failed to provide substantial evidence that the alternative of
downsizing the treatment plant and using decentralized treatment was not feasible or prudent. 156
The court also held that the permitting agency erroneously restricted the discharge only to
prevent degradation below ordinary water quality standards rather than to protect the existing
high quality of the water. 157 Finally, by failing to define the baseline existing quality of the
water, the agency could not evaluate whether the proposed discharge would preserve existing
high quality. 158
In a subsequent case, however, the Minnesota court rejected a challenge to a permit
alleged to be in violation of Minnesota’s anti-degradation rules. 159 An environmental group
claimed that the state agency failed to consider the impact of the introduction of new invasive
species through ballast water discharges into Lake Superior. 160 The court deferred to the
agency’s technical expertise that discharges need only be restricted “to the extent necessary to
preserve the existing high [water] quality.” 161 Although analysis of the impact of new invasive
151

739 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 2012 WL 639264
(9th Cir. Feb 29, 2012).
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Id. at 1292-93.
153
Id. at 1286.
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Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. C’mmr of Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 696 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2005).
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Id. at 101.
156
Id. at 105. Cf. Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 660 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2003) (invalidating general permit for stormwater discharges as violation of anti-degradation rules because the
state agency failed to consider whether discharges were expanded).
157
696 N.W.2d at 107.
158
Id. at 108.
159
In the Matter of a Request for Issuance of the SDS General Permit MNG300000 for Ballast Water Discharges
from Vessels Transiting Minnesota State Waters of Lake Superior, 769 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
160
The surrounding states and tribes have designated Lake Superior as Outstanding International Resource Waters
or Outstanding Resource Waters. See WIS. N.R. 102.10 (2008); MICH. RULE 98(7) (1999); MINN. ADMIN.
7050.0180, 7052.0300(3) (2000); SOKAOGON CHIPPEWA WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 151.30(2) (2005), available
at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/adeg/tribes_cwindex.cfm.
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Id. at 321.
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species on the lake’s quality might have been prudent, the agency’s failure to address the risks
associated with species that had already or might in the future arrive as a result of ballast water
discharges was not arbitrary where the Lake had been “receiving ballast-water pollutants without
restriction for as long as commercial vessels have operated on Lake Superior.” 162
Courts also have taken a deferential stance when environmental plaintiffs have attempted
to use permitting decisions to expand the scope of a state’s anti-degradation policy. In Port of
Seattle v. PCHB, the court affirmed the agency’s certification that an airport runway project
would satisfy the state’s anti-degradation policy despite potential impacts to stream flows in
class AA waters, the equivalent of ONRWs. 163 It seemed to take comfort in the fact that, under
the state’s policy, the developer must offset the impacts of the project, even though it need not
restore the AA waters to pristine condition. 164
C. Anti-degradation Policy Deficiencies
The cases described above demonstrate that the CWA’s anti-degradation policy is neither
fulfilling its potential for identifying and protecting high quality waters nor meeting the five
goals delineated above in Part II. These deficiencies fall into three categories: (1) failure to
ensure that high quality waters are properly designated; (2) failure to define “degradation” and to
identify appropriate triggers for ensuring against it in the face of “important” economic
considerations; and (3) failure to regulate all significant sources of degradation. A fourth
category—failure to detect inadequate anti-degradation plans and follow through with
appropriate enforcement—becomes apparent from a consideration of on-the-ground
implementation issues arising outside of the litigation context. This part explores each of these
deficiencies, while reforms are proposed in Part V below.
1. Designation Inconsistencies
The EPA’s anti-degradation policy does not provide adequate guidance on how to
distinguish Tier 1 from Tier 2 waters. 165 EPA allows states to take either a pollutant-by-pollutant
or water body-by-water body approach, with few substantive parameters. Likewise, EPA’s
definition of Tier 3 is illustrative rather than prescriptive, and its approach to state-by-state
designation is wholly discretionary. 166 Accordingly, some state regulations provide no
procedural or substantive specifications whatsoever for designation decisions, leaving many high
quality waters unprotected beyond the lowest common denominator—Tier 1.
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Id. at 322. For similar outcomes, see, e.g., In re Louisiana Dep’t of Envtl, Quality Permitting Decision: Timber
Branch II Sewage Treatment Plan, 2011 WL 1225985 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2011) (affirming agency’s decision that
discharges of treated sewage would not degrade water quality in ONRW tributary ); In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot.
Act Rules, 180 N.J. 415 (2004) (affirming New Jersey’s authorization of cranberry growing operations in the
ONRWs of the Pinelands National Reserves).
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151 Wash. 2d 568, 90 P.3d 659, 681 (Wash. 2004).
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See supra notes __ - __ and accompanying text.
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See supra notes __ - __ and accompanying text.
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2. What is “Degradation” and When is it Allowed?
In addition to the designation vagaries described above, one key question is how to define
“degradation.” EPA’s regulations utterly fail to recognize the relevance of that question. 167 EPA
apparently allows states to limit Tier 2 protections to activities that result in “significant”
degradation of water quality, invoking the agency’s inherent authority to avoid regulating de
minimis environmental threats..168 State definitions of the point at which impairment triggers
anti-degradation review are inconsistent. 169 Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Kentucky Waterways Alliance indicates, 170 the anti-degradation policy fails to protect against
cumulative effects of multiple discharges that impair existing water quality. 171
A related flaw is the failure to describe when Tier 2 high-quality waters may be degraded
if “necessary” to accommodate “important economic or social development.” 172 How necessary
and important must the development in question be? According to EPA, the phrase seeks to
convey “a general concept regarding what level of social and economic development could be
used to justify a change in high quality waters. Any more exact meaning will evolve thorough
case-by-case application” by the state. 173 The burden of demonstrating economic necessity is
supposed to “be very high.” 174 However, state regulations differ markedly in how they apply
this requirement. 175 Absent constraints, this exception threatens to swallow the anti-degradation
rule. 176
3. What Pollution Sources are Regulated?
In addition to the inconsistencies in defining “degradation” and “important”
development, troublesome gaps have developed through the exclusion of certain pollution
sources. In the intermountain west, for example, “the region’s anti-degradation policies are
riddled with exemptions. The most common exemption is for existing sources—all eight states
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important economic and social development for new or expanded discharges to Tier 2 waters was void for
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‘grandfather’ existing sources, if they are not expanding their discharge.” 177 Only a few states in
the region—Arizona, Wyoming, and New Mexico—appear to meet EPA’s requirement that new
and expanded discharges in tributaries of ONRWs be limited to those that will not degrade water
quality. 178
Exceptions for nonpoint sources—existing or new—are equally widespread. Although a
few states, like New Mexico, 179 Washington, 180 and Florida, 181 apply anti-degradation provisions
to all sources of pollution in ONRWs, including nonpoint sources, many if not most states appear
to have no restrictions on nonpoint source discharges whatsoever. 182 As noted above, Montana’s
exemption for nonpoint sources has been upheld, 183 leaving high-quality waters in rural areas
unprotected from the most significant sources of water pollution. 184
4. Lack of Follow Up
Beyond the lessons learned from several decades of anti-degradation litigation, it appears
that some of the problems associated with implementation of the policy stem from the EPA’s
failure to follow up after a state program has been adopted. As evidenced by the GAO’s
assessment of the Great Lakes Initiative (GLI), the lack of follow through turns in part on EPA’s
failure to issue a consistent permitting strategy for the states. 185 The GLI amendment to the
CWA required that the eight Great Lakes states—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—include provisions consistent with EPA’s GLI
guidance in their regulations and permit programs. 186 But according to the GAO, the states’
permitting structures are not consistent with each other or with any overarching comprehensive
strategy. Moreover, EPA’s attempts to assess the effectiveness of the states’ anti-degradation
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(2006). See Christie C. Morgan, Challenges and Opportunities in Protecting Outstanding National Resource
Waters, 5-SPG Nat. Resources & Env't 30, 33 (1991) (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 17-4.242 (3)(b)).
Interestingly, the Florida legislature specifically prohibited horticultural peat mining—a key economic driver in the
state—in Outstanding Florida Waters. WEST'S F.S.A. § 373.414(2)(d).
182
See, e.g., River Network, supra note , at 54 Tbl. 22 (listing Arizona, Colorado, Montana, and Nevada as lacking
explicit nonpoint source controls); id. at 53 (“The manner in which the states have addressed nonpoint source
pollution control varies dramatically in the [intermountain] region.”).
183
See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. See also Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, IncentiveBased Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 40 (2002) (“For [some] states, increases in nonpoint source pollution that impair existing uses
would not be considered to violate state water quality standards or the antidegradation policy, so long as designated
uses are fully supported.”).
184
Blumm & Warnock, supra note __, at 108-09.
185
U.S. GAO, Great Lakes Initiative, EPA Needs to Better Ensure the Complete and Consistent Implementation of
Water Quality Standards, GAO-05-829, at XX (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247244.pdf. The
1990 amendments to the CWA require the EPA to publish guidance for the Great Lakes states on minimum
standards, implementation procedures, and anti-degradation policies for protecting water quality.
186
Pub. L. 101-596, § 1, 104 Stat. 3000 (1990).
178

25

policies have been hindered by inadequate data. 187 Even for priority pollutants, like dioxin and
other bioaccumulative chemicals, sufficiently sensitive measurements have not been
developed. 188
The GAO concluded that the GLI has limited potential to protect water quality for two
primary reasons: it focuses primarily on point sources, and it condones flexible implementation
procedures, like variances, that relieve dischargers from stringent water quality standards. 189
Indeed, “the GLI allows the repeated use of some of these flexibilities and does not set a time
frame for facilities to meet the GLI water quality criteria.” 190 Moreover, the inability to reliably
measure pollutant concentrations hinders the implementation of anti-degradation policies.191
The GAO’s report advised EPA to issue permitting strategies that provide for a more consistent
approach among the states and to gather and track information that can be used to assess the
progress of implementing the anti-degradation policy and its impact on reducing pollutant
discharges and improving water quality. 192
If the well-funded, well-coordinated Great Lakes Initiative has made so little progress, it
should be no surprise that anti-degradation policies in other regions are lagging behind as
well. 193 As the River Network concluded in its report on the intermountain west, “[t]he power of
anti-degradation is vastly underdeveloped.” 194
IV. A COMPARISON OF ANTI-DEGRADATION PROGRAMS AND PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT
PROTECTION REGIMES
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Most federal public land management statutes include some sort of anti-degradation
provision, ranging from outright prohibitions against impairment of the land and its natural
resources to more lenient provisions aimed at protecting certain priority resources from
destruction by incompatible uses. This part considers an array of preservation-oriented statutes
governing wilderness areas, National Parks, Wildlife Refuges, and Wild and Scenic Rivers, as
well as two key conservation-oriented statutes that provide for sustained yields on lands
managed by the National Forest Service and BLM. These statutes may apply directly to waters
covered by the existing CWA anti-degradation policy, especially Tier 3 ONRWs, many of which
run through wilderness areas, parks, refuges, or other protected areas. Even when the land
management statutes do not themselves apply to waters covered by the anti-degradation policy,
they may serve as models for mechanisms to strengthen the protections of the aquatic
environments that are or should be covered by the CWA’s anti-degradation policy.
A. A Hierarchy of Protective Standards
1. The National Wilderness System
The Wilderness Act of 1964 is the nation’s preeminent preservation statute. 195 Today,
federally designated wilderness areas are found within National Forests, National Parks, Wildlife
Refuges, and lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management. There are nearly 700
wilderness areas in forty-four states, covering 109 million acres of land. 196
The fundamental purpose of the Wilderness Act is to secure the present and future
benefits of untrammeled wild lands for the public. 197 To accomplish this goal, the Act specifies
that wilderness areas shall be managed “in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future
use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for . . . the preservation of their wilderness
character. . . .” 198 It also directs the managing agencies to protect and manage wilderness areas
“so as to preserve natural conditions.” 199
In 1977, not long after the advent of the CWA’s anti-degradation policy, Dean William
Hines called anti-degradation “the pollution control analogue to wilderness protection in public
lands management.” 200 In implementation, however, the Wilderness Act has proven far more
protective than the CWA’s anti-degradation policy.
195
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degradation may not involve all of the problems of irreversibility that are raised in the destruction of other natural
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To accomplish its preservation-oriented purposes, the Wilderness Act prohibits activities
that would impair or otherwise detract from the wildness of wilderness areas. 201 Permanent
roads as well as commercial activities are strictly forbidden. 202 With some exceptions, the Act
also precludes motor vehicles, motorized equipment, mechanical transport, aircraft landings,
structures, and installations. 203
The first exception is found in section 4(c), which provides:
[E]xcept as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area
for the purpose of this [Act] (including measures required in emergencies involving the
health and safety of persons within the area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of
motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form
of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area. 204
Courts have construed this exception relatively narrowly. 205 In a case involving the Kofa
Wilderness in Arizona, the Ninth Circuit enjoined the construction and maintenance of tanks to
augment water supplies for bighorn sheep. The court found that, although sheep conservation
was undoubtedly a legitimate management objective, the tanks were installations that unlawfully
trammeled the wilderness. Although such installations might be useful to sheep threatened by
drought and high temperatures, the FWS had failed to establish that they were a necessary
minimum requirement for wilderness administration. 206 The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar
conclusion in Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, where it enjoined the Park Service’s practice of
transporting tourists in a passenger van across the Cumberland Island Wilderness in order to
provide access to historical structures. 207 It rejected the Park Service’s argument that such
services were “necessary” just because they made access more convenient and had “no net
environments. Therefore, it might be expected that the policy would be applied most stringently when the
threatened air and water resources either themselves are subject to irreversible damage or are inextricably related to
other natural systems subject to such harm.” Id. at 652-53.
201
16 U.S.C. § 1131(b) (2006). See Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 814 F.
Supp. 2d 992, 1014-17 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (agencies that manage wilderness are “responsible for preserving . . .
wilderness character”; “the Act is intended to enshrine the long-term preservation of wilderness areas as the ultimate
goal”) (citing Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010)). The
principal author of the Wilderness Act, Howard Zahniser, viewed the term “wild” as synonymous with
“untrammeled”: “not subject to human controls and manipulations that hamper the free play of natural forces.”
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202
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2006). See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003),
as amended on reh'g en banc in part, 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004) (enjoining commercial salmon enhancement
project); Barnes v. Babbitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Ariz. 2004) (invalidating a plan that allowed repairs and
maintenance of access routes as unlawful road construction).
203
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2006).
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HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2011) (finding that courts are more likely to uphold wilderness-protective decisions
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increase” in impacts to the land. 208 Likewise, in Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, a federal district court rejected the Forest Service’s argument that the
application of rotenone was a necessary step toward the recovery of the Paiute Cutthroat
Trout. 209 It held that the agency neglected the well-being of other endemic species and
unlawfully concluded that rotenone applications were necessary to preserve wilderness
character. 210
The second exception for otherwise non-conforming activities in wilderness areas,
section 4(d), authorizes “such measures . . . as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects,
and diseases.” 211 The only published opinions directly on point involve the Forest Service’s
efforts to control the southern pine beetle. In the first of two related cases, the court remanded a
proposal for extensive chemical spraying and logging as “wholly antithetical to the wilderness
policy established by Congress,” and “hardly consonant with preservation and protection of these
areas in their natural state.” 212 The court explained that “[o]nly a clear necessity for upsetting
the equilibrium of the ecology could justify this highly injurious, semi-experimental venture of
limited effectiveness.” 213 In the second case, the court upheld a pared down version of the
proposal that used “spot control” logging to combat infestations. 214 It approved measures that
“fall short of full effectiveness” so long as they are “reasonably designed” to limit infestation. 215
It was careful to note, however, that the agency had significantly scaled back its plan and had
adopted several preservation-oriented safeguards. 216
The Wilderness Act has been a significant factor in preventing the degradation of
federally designated wilderness areas. 217 Of course, there is room for criticism. Some
commentators argue that, “managers have extensively manipulated wilderness to achieve desired
ends.” 218 But of all the federal land management statutes, the Wilderness Act provides
sufficiently detailed standards to hold officials accountable and to enable concerned citizens to
obtain relief through judicial review. As Professor Peter Appel found, based on an empirical
analysis of wilderness litigation in the federal courts:
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When agencies defend decisions that arguably threaten wilderness protection against
challenges by environmental organizations, the agencies win only about 44% of the time.
When agencies defend decisions against challenges that they are protecting wilderness
too stringently, they prevail in approximately 88% of their cases. This two-fold
difference in success rates depending on the type of challenge indicates a significant
difference in how courts approach wilderness decisions. 219
Appel described this phenomenon “as a one-way judicial ratchet in favor of wilderness
protection.” 220 His study demonstrates that the courts are more willing to give heightened
protection to wilderness areas than to other areas covered by federal law.
Although the Wilderness Act is not a complete analogue to the CWA, given its
distinctive preservation-oriented edict for lands that are owned solely by the federal government,
it can provide a few important lessons for improving the anti-degradation program. The
statutory prohibition against impairment, coupled with the directive to preserve wilderness
character and natural conditions, gives agencies, courts, and citizens substantial powers to
prevent degradation. In addition, courts’ willingness to require “a clear necessity,” not just
convenience, to invoke exceptions to the Act’s preservation provisions could serve as a useful
guidepost for implementation of the necessity determination for degradation of Tier II waters. 221
2. The National Parks
One of the earliest expressions of an anti-degradation requirement in federal law is found
in the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916. The Act requires the Park Service to manage
the national parks “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner . . . as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 222
Over the years, the system has been wildly popular with the American public, and it has
grown to include 397 national parks located in forty-nine states and several U.S. territories. 223
But the dual mandate of the Organic Act—to conserve park resources from impairment and also
to provide for the enjoyment of them—poses a significant challenge for the Park Service, and it
has not always prevented degradation of park resources. Professor Robert Keiter explains:
[T]he system has evolved over the years in a haphazard fashion, driven more by hardheaded political calculations and attractive scenic features than by a sweeping
commitment to preserving diverse ecosystems or key biological specimens. In fact, even
with their protective status, the existing national parks are not secure from outside
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development pressures, which have disrupted wildlife travel corridors, fouled park
waters, polluted regional air sheds, and altered surrounding landscapes. 224
In 1978, Congress passed an amendment to the Organic Act, which specifies that “[t]he
authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection, management, and administration
of these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the
National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for
which these various areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be directly
and specifically provided by Congress.” 225
The Park Service construes the “no derogation” standard of the 1978 amendment as
synonymous with the non-impairment standard of the 1916 Organic Act. 226 The courts have
concurred with this interpretation. 227 Thus, in making decisions, the Park Service must “examine
the duration, severity, and magnitude of the impact; the resources and values affected; and direct,
indirect, and cumulative effects of the action.” 228 If impairment would result, “the action may
not be approved.” 229
The non-impairment requirement goes hand in hand with the Act’s broader
conservation mandate. 230 The Park Service states that the conservation mandate “applies all the
time, with respect to all park resources and values, even when there is no risk that any park
resources or values may be impaired.” 231 The conservation mandate is further construed as
requiring protection of “[t]he parks’ scenery ... wildlife, and the processes and conditions that
224
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sustain them ... including the ecological, biological, and physical processes that created the park
... natural visibility ... water and air resources ...and native plants and animals.” 232
Where uncertainties arise, the conservation concept acts as a precautionary principle of
sorts. The Park Service recognizes that the “threshold at which impairment occurs is not always
readily apparent,” 233 so it has committed itself “to applying a standard that offers greater
assurance that impairment will not occur . . . by avoiding impacts that it determines to be
unacceptable.” 234 It defines “unacceptable impacts” as those that would individually or
cumulatively:
·

be inconsistent with a park’s purposes or values, or

·

impede the attainment of a park’s desired future conditions for natural and cultural
resources as identified through the park’s planning process, or

·

create an unsafe or unhealthful environment for visitors or employees, or

·

diminish opportunities for current or future generations to enjoy, learn about, or be
inspired by park resources or values, or

·

unreasonably interfere with . . . the atmosphere of peace and tranquility, or the natural
soundscape maintained in wilderness and natural, historic, or commemorative
locations within the park. . . . 235

The courts have generally agreed that “when there is a conflict between conserving
resources and values and providing for enjoyment of them, conservation is to be
predominant.” 236 They tend to uphold the Park Service’s decisions to restrict access and usage in
order to ensure against impairment of resources and thereby promote conservation. 237 In one
case, a court even found an affirmative duty to assert federal reserved water rights for a unit of
the National Park System—a canyon—that required instream flows to maintain its ecological
integrity and natural soundscape. 238
232
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However, the Organic Act’s dual mandate—to conserve resources from impairment
while allowing public enjoyment—leaves the Park Service with discretion to balance the need
for public access against the need to prevent degradation of resources. As the Ninth Circuit
observed:
[T]he so-called ‘impairment review’ . . . is explicitly recognized as involving a decision
by the superintendent that calls for reconciling the ‘inevitabl[e] ... tension between
conservation of resources on the one hand and public enjoyment on the other.’ This
reconciliation calls for judgment on the part of the NPS. . . . 239
The court explained that the discretionary language of the NPS’s Management Policy “implicates
the NPS's broader mandate to balance access with conservation.” 240 Some commentators have
argued that this dualism results in a type of immunity when Park Service decisions are
challenged in court, compelling courts to uphold the agency’s decisions whether they tip in favor
of recreation or conservation, even if the two conflict. 241 Nonetheless, the Park Service’s
relatively stringent definitions of “impairment” and “unacceptable impacts” could serve as useful
guideposts in defining “anti-degradation” in the CWA context.
3. Wild and Scenic Rivers
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) of 1968 creates a nationwide system of wild,
scenic, and recreational rivers. 242 There are over 200 rivers, encompassing thousands of miles,
in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System. 243
In the WSRA, Congress declared that “the established national policy of dam and other
construction . . . needs to be complemented by a policy that would preserve other selected rivers
or sections thereof in their free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and
to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes.” 244 Thus, designated rivers must be freeflowing and must also have “outstandingly remarkable” values (ORVs). 245
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Upon designation, rivers are classified as wild, scenic, or recreational. Wild rivers are
“free of impoundments and generally inaccessible except by trail, with watersheds or shorelines
essentially primitive and waters unpolluted.” 246 Scenic and recreational rivers are also generally
free of impoundments, but they are more accessible by road and may have some development
along their shorelines. 247
Wild river segments, which like wilderness areas are “essentially primitive,” are highly
protected. 248 Rivers classified as recreational or scenic are governed by more lenient
management standards. 249 Regardless of classification, dams are prohibited, 250 and designated
rivers must be administered in a manner to “protect and enhance” their ORVs. 251 Moreover, no
federal department or agency may undertake or assist in any “water resources project” that would
have a “direct and adverse effect” on a river’s ORVs, 252 and deleterious projects may be
enjoined. 253 In a series of Oregon cases decided in the late 1990s, courts found that the BLM’s
management of grazing practices violated the WSRA. In Oregon Natural Desert Association v.
Green, the court remanded the BLM’s management plan for failure to consider whether grazing
would “protect and enhance” vegetative ORVs. 254 Grazing was subsequently enjoined when the
BLM’s plan showed the negative impacts of grazing on scenic and recreational values. 255
Although the Oregon cases indicate a willingness to engage in probing judicial review of
activities with undeniably detrimental effects on ORVs, courts have been inconsistent in
reviewing challenges to the Comprehensive Management Plans (CMPs) for designated river
246
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segments. 256 In Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, the court found that the lack of a
comprehensive CMP warranted enjoining nine redevelopment projects in a designated river
corridor. 257 Conversely, in Center for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel, the court dismissed a
complaint for lack of standing where the plaintiffs failed to show a causal link between the
authorization of detrimental logging activities and the absence of a CMP. 258 According to the
court, there was “no evidence” that CMPs “typically provide for greater restrictions” than other
types of federal land management plans. 259
Like the anti-degradation program, WSRA management restrictions seem to be
underutilized tools. 260 As litigants have found, broad-brush challenges to a management
agency’s discretion to balance competing uses typically fail, but challenges that identify discrete,
harmful activities that violate specific obligations to protect specific ORVs in a particular river
segment may gain more traction. 261
4. National Wildlife Refuges
The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 (NWRSIA) sets forth a
clear conservation mission for the System and the 545 national wildlife refuges included within
it:
The mission of the System is to administer a national network of lands and waters for the
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and
plant resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of present and
future generations of Americans. 262
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See 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d) (2006) (requiring CMPs within three years of designation).
520 F.3d 1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1252 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(“[W]here . . . an agency has egregiously violated a procedural planning requirement which is closely linked to the
ability of the agency to adequately assess the impacts of future plans and actions on the river’s ORV’s, that
procedural violation lends great weight to assertions that the substantive requirement to preserve and enhance the
values for which river was included in the wild and scenic river system has been violated.”).
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417 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2005). See also In re Montana Wilderness Assn., 807 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1000 (D. Mont.
2011) (rejecting argument that a plan’s purported failure to address motorized uses and user capacities violated the
WSRA when the BLM had balanced competing values of solitude and recreation by imposing road closures and
seasonal restrictions while reaffirming long-standing uses).
259
471 F.3d at 540. The court found no evidence that a CRP would provide greater protection than the existing
forest plan, which stated that designated river corridors “will be managed to protect and enhance the values for
which the river was designated.” Id. at 540. Indeed, the WSRA provides that, in cases of conflict between the
WSRA and other land management statutes, “the more restrictive provisions shall apply.” 16 U.S.C. §
1281(b) & (c) (2006).
260
See Murray Feldman, William McLaughlin, & Jennifer Hill, Learning to Manage our Wild and Scenic River
System, 20-Fall NAT. RES. & ENV'T 10, 70 (2005). (although the WSRA “provides a unique blend of conservation,
development, and use for its river segment components . . . the managing agencies . . . are finding it difficult to give
priority to wild and scenic rivers in these times of reduced budgets for resource management activities”).
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Feldman, supra note , at 70.
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Id. § 668dd(a) (emphasis added). See Robert L. Fischman, From Words To Action: The Impact and Legal Status
of the 2006 National Wildlife Refuge System Management Policies, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 78 (2007) (describing
the “ninety-six million acre network of reserves and easements dedicated to nature protection” within the System as
“the nation's most valuable asset for ecological conservation”).
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Thus, conservation is the first priority for wildlife refuges. 263 The Act defines
conservation as “to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance, healthy populations of
fish, wildlife, and plants.” 264 In addition, it directs the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to
administer the System to:
(A) provide for the conservation of fish, wildlife, and plants, and their habitats within the
System;
[and]
(B) ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the System
are maintained for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans. . . . . 265
According to Professor Robert Fischman, “One of the most noteworthy aspects of the
1997 law is the relatively rich detail of the substantive management criteria, compared to
previous federal organic statutes.” 266 To achieve the conservation goals of the System, the Act
allows only “compatible uses” that “will not materially interfere with or detract from the
fulfillment of the mission of the System or the purposes of the refuge.” 267 FWS regulations
specify that the FWS “will not initiate or permit a new use of a national wildlife refuge or
expand, renew, or extend an existing use of a national wildlife refuge, unless the Refuge
Manager has determined that the use is a compatible use.” 268 When any existing use is deemed
incompatible, the FWS “will expeditiously terminate or modify the use to make it
compatible.” 269
Economic uses of refuge resources—livestock grazing, mineral development, and other
uses conducted for a profit—must satisfy an additional requirement. 270 The FWS “may only
263

3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 24:5 (2d ed.
2007) (citing 16 U.S.C.A. § 668dd(a)(2)). See 603 Fish and Wildlife Manual (FWM) 1.4(a), available at
http://www.fws.gov/policy/manuals/ (“Refuges are first and foremost national treasures for the conservation of
wildlife.” Conservation will be achieved “[t]hrough careful planning, consistent Refuge Systemwide application of
regulations and policies, diligent monitoring of the impacts of uses on wildlife resources, and preventing or
eliminating uses not appropriate to the Refuge System. . .”).
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16 U.S.C.A. § 668ee(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
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Id. § 668dd(a). An executive order issued by President Clinton characterizes the conservation duty as a “trustee
and stewardship” responsibility: “Fish and wildlife will not prosper without high-quality habitat, and without fish
and wildlife, traditional uses of refuges cannot be sustained. The Refuge System will continue to conserve and
enhance the quality and diversity of fish and wildlife habitat within refuges.” Exec. Order No. 12996, §§ (2)(b),
(3)(e), 61 Fed. Reg. 13647 (1996) (emphasis added).
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Fischman, From Words To Action, supra note , at 111. See also Robert L. Fischman, Beyond Trust Species: The
Conservation Potential Of The National Wildlife Refuge System In The Wake Of Climate Change, 51 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1 (2011); Robert L. Fischman, The Significance of National Wildlife Refuges in the Development of
U.S. Conservation Policy, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2005); Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge
System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457 (2002).
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16 U.S.C.A. § 668ee(1) (2006).
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50 C.F.R. § 26.41.
269
50 C.F.R. § 26.41(d).
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50 C.F.R. § 29.1. The FWS’s manual for wildlife refuges defines economic use as “[a]ny activity involving the
use of a refuge or its resources for a profit.” 5 FWM § 17.6(D). In a separate FWS policy, the term “refuge
management economic activity” is defined as “[a] refuge management activity on a national wildlife refuge that
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603 FWM § 2 .6(N). See Delaware Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Salazar, 2011 WL 4368512, *12 (D. Del. 2011) (finding
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authorize public or private economic use of the natural resources of any national wildlife refuge .
. . where the use contributes to the achievement of the national wildlife refuge purposes or the
National Wildlife Refuge System mission.” 271
Under the FWS regulations, compatibility determinations are typically made as part of
the comprehensive conservation plan (CCP) for each refuge, 272 but “a refuge manager always
may re-evaluate the compatibility of a use at any time,” 273 particularly “when conditions under
which the use is permitted change significantly, or if there is significant new information
regarding the effects of the use. . . .” 274 The FWS Manual emphasizes that the first goal of a
CCP is “[t]o ensure that wildlife comes first in the National Wildlife Refuge System.” 275
Although recreational impacts could undercut the conservation mission, the statute
identifies wildlife-dependent recreation as a preferred (compatible) use of the Refuge System.276
As a result, in the past, “excessive weight [was] given to hunting and fishing.” 277 However,
according to Professor Fischman:
[T]he text [of the new FWS Policy] . . . explicitly include[s] two of the substantive
management criteria (compatibility; and biological integrity, diversity, and environmental
health) as evaluative criteria for deciding whether to allow wildlife-dependent recreation
programs. . . . In the end, the Policy manages to make advancing the system mission of
conservation, supported by the integrity-diversity-health mandate, . . . a higher priority

that a dune restoration project was not an economic use, where sand would not be sold but would be used to restore
beaches and dunes).
271
50 C.F.R. § 29.1. See Delaware Audubon Soc., Inc. v. Secretary, 612 F. Supp. 2d 442 (D. Del. 2009) (enjoining
decision to allow cooperative farming and farming with genetically modified crops in a refuge without first
preparing a written compatibility determination); Stevens County v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1127,
1133-35 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (FWS’s determination that livestock grazing was not a compatible use was entitled to
deference; although some studies showed the grazing could have a positive impact on habitat, other studies
demonstrated the negative effects of grazing on migratory bird populations and riparian habitats, and site-specific
studies demonstrated that grazing materially interfered with wildlife management on the refuge). See also
Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 5 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding FWS’s decision to renew grazing permits where
the FWS failed to consider the incompatibility of grazing with refuge purposes, even in the face of report of the
refuge manager that current grazing practices were harming fish and wildlife habitats).
272
See 50 C.F.R. § 26.41 (“We will usually complete compatibility determinations as part of
the comprehensive conservation plan or step-down management plan process for individual uses, specific use
programs, or groups of related uses described in the plan”).
273
Id. § 25.21(f). See id. § 25.21(b) (“We may open a national wildlife refuge for any refuge use, or expand,
renew, or extend an existing refuge use only after the Refuge Manager determines that it is a compatible use and not
inconsistent with any applicable law”).
274
50 C.F.R. § 25.21(f).
275
602 FWM 3.3.A (2000), at http://www.fws.gov/policy/602fw3.html. CCPs are required by 16 U.S.C.
668dd(e)(E)(2) (2006) and 50 C.F.R. § 25.12..
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See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(3)(a)(iii) (2006) (“Wildlife-dependent recreational uses may be authorized on a refuge
when they are compatible and not inconsistent with public safety. Except for consideration of consistency with
State laws and regulations as provided for in subsection (m) of this section, no other determinations or findings are
required . . . for wildlife-dependent recreation to occur.”). Wildlife-dependent uses include hunting, fishing, wildlife
observation and photography, and environmental education and interpretation. Id. § 668ee(1).
277
Fischman, From Words To Action, supra note , at 107-108. See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(D) (2006).
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than promoting wildlife-dependent recreation. Anything short of that would have run
afoul of the legislation. 278
A potential deficiency in the statutory scheme is the failure to apply the compatibility
requirement to the FWS’s own management actions. In Fund for Animals v. Clark, 279 the district
court held that the FWS had no statutory duty to conduct a compatibility analysis of its feeding
programs for bison and elk in the National Elk Refuge, because activities conducted by refuge
managers were not refuge “uses” within the meaning of the Act. 280 The court acknowledged that
the statutory list of “uses” to be governed by the compatibility requirement (recreation, public
access, easements, roads, and the like) “are not meant to be all inclusive,” 281 but those uses
“encompass a common ingredient . . . they are all ‘uses’ meant to be performed by third parties
or the public.” 282 It bolstered this conclusion by reference to § 668dd(c), which it construed as
“specifically exempt[ing] from the compatibility requirement actions taken by ‘persons
authorized to manage’ the refuge area.” 283 The FWS has since adopted a regulation defining
“refuse use” as use “by the public or other non-National Wildlife Refuge System entity.” 284
Fischman concludes that the stewardship responsibilities embedded in the statutory
conservation mandate should guide decisionmakers to prevent impairment of Refuge
resources. 285 Courts have been willing to uphold FWS decisions to limit access to protect refuge
resources, 286 but they have been equally inclined to uphold FWS decisions to allow use. 287 Thus,
discretion can cut both ways. Yet the NWRSIA’s directive to “ensure that the biological
integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the System are maintained for the benefit of
278

Fischman, From Words To Action, supra note , at 111-12 (citing FWM, supra note ___, pt. 605 § 1.13(B), §
1.8(B), (D)(3)). See FWS, Final Appropriate Refuge Uses Policy, available at http://policy.fws.gov/ser600.html
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Id. at 11 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 6688dd(1)(A)-(B)). A district court in Delaware found that a FWS dune restoration
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Audubon Soc’y v. Salazar, 2011 WL 4368512, *11-13 (D. Del. 2011).
283
Fund for Animals v. Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 6688dd(c)). Subsection 668dd(c) sets forth
the general prohibitions against any persons disturbing or possessing “any real or personal property of the United
States, including natural growth, in any area of the System,” or taking or possessing any wild animals within
refuges, “unless such activities are performed by persons authorized to manage such area, or unless such activities
are permitted . . . [as compatible uses] under subsection (d). . . .”
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See 50 C.F.R. § 25.12(a).
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Fischman, From Words To Action, supra note , at 111.
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See Niobrara River Ranch, L.L.C. v. Huber, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Neb. 2003), aff’d, 373 F.3d 881 (8th Cir.
2004) (affirming FWS’s decision to limit recreational rafting and canoeing in a refuge).
287
See Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a decision that a
salmon aquaculture project within a refuge in Alaska was compatible with refuge purposes), reh'g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 340 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on reh'g en banc, 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
that aquaculture project violated the Wilderness Act without resolving whether the project also violated the
NWRSIA). In Fund for Animals v. Hall, 448 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2006), the court found that the FWS violated
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assessments. Fund for Animals v. Hall, 777 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2011).
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present and future generations,” 288 coupled with its compatibility requirement, could be useful in
the effort to supply a meaningful definition of degradation under the CWA.
5. Multiple Use Lands
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service both manage the lands
under their jurisdiction under a multiple use, sustained yield mandate that is less preservationoriented than the management regimes discussed above. The organic statutes for these two
agencies nevertheless provide some protection against degradation of certain resources, and
therefore may be relevant to achieving the goals of the anti-degradation policy.
a. BLM Management of the Public Lands
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), the BLM’s organic act,
requires that the BLM manage the public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained
yield in accordance with land use plans (called resource management plans) developed by the
agency. 289 In addition, FLPMA requires that in managing the public lands the BLM “shall, by
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation
of the lands.” 290 The statute defines neither unnecessary nor undue degradation. 291
The BLM has defined those terms, but its interpretations have shifted over the years. In
1980, the agency adopted what became known as the “prudent operator standard” in its
regulations governing hardrock mining on public lands. That definition focused on what
activities were necessary to mine rather than on the impact of mining on the environment.292
The agency took the position that it lacked the authority to prohibit mining if the mine operator
had complied with applicable requirements under statutes such as pollution control laws and
acted prudently, even if operations resulted in environmental damage. 293
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Id. § 1732(b).
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See Gregory M. Adams, Bringing Green Power to Public Lands: The Bureau of Land Management’s Authority
and Discretion to Regulate Wind-Energy Developments, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 445, 470 (2007) (“[T]he vague
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Cf. Roger Flynn & Jeffrey Parsons, The Right to Say No: Federal Authority over Hardrock Mining on Public Lands,
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The 1980 definition provided in part that “[u]nnecessary or undue degradation means surface disturbance greater
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and proficient operations of similar character . . . .” 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (1981). The regulations specified that
failure to initiate and complete reasonable mitigation measures might constitute unnecessary or undue degradation,
and that failure to comply with applicable environmental protection laws would do so.
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One source described the prudent operator standard as follows:
Stated differently, the “prudent operator” standard acknowledged that some environmental degradation was
inherent in hardrock mining and that BLM would prevent only disturbance “greater than would normally
result” from an operation conducted with due care. . . .
John F. Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the Environment: Issues of Enforcement and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q.
795, 844 (2004).
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In 2000, the BLM amended its mining regulations by redefining “unnecessary and undue
degradation” to halt “conditions, activities, or practices that . . . result in substantial irreparable
harm to significant scientific, cultural, or environmental resource values of the public lands that
cannot be effectively mitigated.” 294 The very next year, however, the BLM changed the
definition again, concluding that the terms unnecessary and undue were equivalent to one
another and represented a single standard, rather than two distinct statutory standards. The
agency took the position that as long as a mining activity was “necessary to mining,” FLPMA
provided no authority for the BLM to restrict it. 295 Some observers regard the 2001 definition,
which remains in effect, 296 as even weaker than the prudent operator standard. 297
Environmental groups challenged the 2001 regulatory definition, taking issue with the
agency’s view that the reference to undue degradation added nothing to the prohibition on
unnecessary degradation. 298 The district court in Mineral Policy Center v. Norton agreed with
the plaintiffs that FLPMA requires the BLM to disapprove of an otherwise permissible mining
operation which, while necessary for mining, would unduly harm or degrade the public land.299
Congress sought to prevent not only unnecessary degradation, but also degradation that is
necessary to mining but also undue or excessive. 300 The court nevertheless upheld the 2001
regulation as a result of the BLM’s commitment to exercise its discretionary authority to protect
the public lands from unnecessary or undue degradation on a case-by-case basis in approving or
rejecting individual mining plans of operations. 301 Although the court characterized the question
as “extremely close,” it upheld the regulation. 302
The courts have also addressed claims that the BLM violated its mandate to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation in approving particular projects or activities. They have
almost uniformly rejected those challenges, deferring to the BLM’s conclusions that activities
such as off-road vehicle use 303 and a major gold mining project 304 would not result in
294
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impermissible degradation. 305 One court rejected the claim that the BLM’s renewal of a grazing
permit violated FLPMA, relying on the BLM’s representation that it would monitor the potential
impacts under adaptive management to prevent degradation. 306 Noticeably absent was any
requirement that the BLM actually commit to doing anything in the event that its monitoring
efforts revealed that unnecessary or undue degradation was occurring.
The culmination of efforts to water down the unnecessary or undue degradation
requirement may have come in the Ninth Circuit’s 2011 decision in Theodore Roosevelt
Conservation Partnership v. Salazar. 307 The issue was whether the record supported the BLM’s
determination that conditions on the approval of expanded natural gas development would
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation. 308 The court reasoned that it had to view the
nondegradation “standard in light of [FLPMA’s] overarching mandate” that the BLM manage
the public lands using multiple use, sustained yield principles. 309 It added that:
While these obligations are distinct, they are interrelated and highly correlated. . . . Thus,
by following FLPMA’s multiple-use and sustained-yield mandates, the Bureau will often,
if not always, fulfill FLPMA’s requirement that it prevent environmental degradation
because the former principles already require the Bureau to balance potentially degrading
uses—e.g., mineral extraction, grazing, or timber harvesting—with conservation of the
natural environment. If the Bureau appropriately balances those uses and follows
principles of sustained yield, then generally it will have taken the steps necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation. 310
The court essentially wrote the unnecessary or undue degradation standard out of the statute by
concluding that management decisions that conform to multiple use, sustained yield principles
will necessarily comply with the nondegradation mandate, too. 311 In other contexts, the courts
have refused to endorse interpretations of FLPMA that have the effect of sapping statutory
language of all force. 312
305
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The court qualified its holding somewhat, stating that conformity to multiple use, sustained yield principles “will
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to prevent unnecessary degradation. If one takes the position that this is what Congress intended, then the language
of impairment must be mere surplusage. Statutory rules of construction are against such a finding.”).
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FLPMA includes a second provision that limits activities with the potential to degrade
public lands and resources, but it applies to a narrower range of circumstances than § 302(b)’s
unnecessary or undue degradation prohibition. Section 603(c) requires the BLM to manage
wilderness study areas (WSAs) on BLM lands “in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of
such areas for preservation of wilderness,” subject to mining, grazing, and mineral leasing uses,
provided that the agency shall “take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation of the lands and their resources or to afford environmental protection.” 313 WSAs are
areas identified in BLM inventories as having wilderness characteristics and which the President
has recommended for official wilderness designation. 314
The scope of § 603(c) is limited—it operates as a mechanism for ensuring that the BLM’s
management of WSAs maintains the status quo while Congress considers whether to include
those areas in the national wilderness system or release them for multiple use management under
FLPMA. During this interim period, the area must be managed (1) so as not to impair its
suitability for preservation as wilderness, and (2) to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation or
to afford environmental protection. 315
The BLM has defined impairment of suitability in its hardrock mining regulations as
“actions that cause impacts, that cannot be reclaimed to the point of being substantially
unnoticeable” by the time the Interior Secretary makes a wilderness recommendation, or that
“have degraded wilderness values so far . . . as to significantly constrain the Secretary’s
recommendation with respect to the area’s suitability for preservation as wilderness.” 316 BLM’s
management guidelines for lands undergoing wilderness review provide that “[a]ctivities that
protect or enhance the land’s wilderness values or provide the minimum necessary facilities for
public enjoyment of wilderness values are considered nonimpairing.” 317 According to the BLM,
the nonimpairment mandate focuses on the impact an activity has on an area’s potential for
wilderness designation. 318
The agency has also taken the position that the existing uses exempted from the
nonimpairment mandate are nevertheless subject to the prohibition on unnecessary or undue
313
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degradation. 319 . The courts have endorsed this position. 320 The Interim Management Policy
defines undue or unnecessary degradation in the WSA context to mean “impacts greater than
those that would normally be expected from an activity” being conducted using best
management practices or the best reasonably available technology. 321 Failure to initiate and
complete reasonable mitigation measures may constitute unnecessary or undue degradation,
while failure to comply with applicable environmental protection statutes will necessarily do
so. 322 One court endorsed the position that “unnecessary” degradation is that which could have
been avoided, while “undue” degradation is “that which is excessive, improper, immoderate or
unwarranted.” 323
FLPMA’s unnecessary and undue degradation provisions are of questionable utility as a
model for strengthening the CWA’s anti-degradation policy in light of judicial decisions that
weaken its force, if not completely obliterate it as a constraint on management discretion.
Section 603(c)’s nonimpairment mandate is clearly more restrictive. As one federal district court
noted, “[t]he word ‘impair’ would prevent many activities that would not be prevented by the
language of ‘unnecessary or undue degradation.” 324 For example, carefully conducted
commercial timber harvesting would not result in unnecessary or undue degradation, but might
impair wilderness characteristics. Although FLPMA’s nonimpairment mandate represents a
temporary protection pending congressional action on wilderness recommendations, there is
nothing in the standard that is inherently inconsistent with a more permanent application in other
contexts. If the mandate were incorporated into the CWA anti-degradation policy, it might be
phrased to prohibit discharges that (1) degrade water quality to a degree that precludes
reclamation to the point of being substantially unnoticeable, or (2) render a water body
unsuitability for fishable/swimmable and higher uses. It is not clear whether the first constraint
would eliminate the problems that the current policy poses in failing to define what amounts to
“significant” degradation. In addition, it would fail to require restoration of impaired high
quality waters. 325 The second constraint appears to restate the prohibitions on impairment
reflected in the existing anti-degradation policy. Thus, FLPMA is not an ideal model for
strengthening the anti-degradation policy.
b. Management of the National Forests
The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) includes management and
planning provisions to guide the Forest Service in seeking an appropriate mix of uses in the
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National Forest System. 326 Like FLPMA, the statute embraces multiple use, sustained yield
principles, and explicitly recognizes “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and
fish, and wilderness” as appropriate forest uses. 327
NFMA’s provisions include few parallels to the anti-degradation policy. The statute
requires forest plans to “ensure research and evaluation of effects of each management system to
assure no substantial and permanent impairment of land productivity.” 328 In addition, forest plans
must prevent irreversible damage to soil, slope, or other watershed conditions and protect
streams and other bodies of water from detrimental changes if harvests are likely to seriously and
adversely affect water conditions or fish habitat.” 329 According to the courts, the need to balance
these protections while providing for multiple uses of the forests “is just the type of policyoriented decision Congress wisely left to the discretion of the experts—here, the Forest
Service.” 330 As a result, the courts have been loath to upset the multiple-use sustained-yield
agenda. 331
NFMA also requires that forest plans “provide for diversity of plant and animal
communities.” 332 This vague provision imposes weak constraints on Forest Service
discretion. 333 With a few notable exceptions, 334 the courts have generally refused to require any
precise level of diversity. As one court put it, “[t]he agency’s judgment in assessing issues
requiring a high level of technical expertise, such as diversity, must ... be accorded the
considerable respect that matters within the agency's expertise deserve.” 335 The Forest Service
has amended the regulations that implement the diversity requirement more than once, with some
versions containing more specific constraints on forest management than others. 336 Although the
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courts have been more willing to enjoin timber harvests and other projects that would diminish
viable populations under the more detailed versions, by and large they have deferred to the
agency’s discretionary decisions in applying the regulations. 337
Some WSAs within the National Forest System are subject to a requirement somewhat
similar to that found in FLPMA, depending on the specific language of the statewide wilderness
act. For example, Montana’s Wilderness Act requires the Forest Service “to maintain” the
wilderness character as it existed on the date of enactment [1977].” 338 In Russell Country
Sportsmen, the Ninth Circuit held that this mandate gave the agency the authority not only to
maintain but also to enhance the wild, natural characteristics by closing off pre-existing routes to
motor vehicles. 339
NFMA and its implementing regulations impose some constraints on management
decisions that threaten to degrade sensitive wildlife, plants, and water quality. The general
nature of these constraints, and the judicial reluctance in many cases to rely on them to halt
timber, grazing, and other projects detrimental to resource integrity, make them poor models for
strengthening the CWA’s anti-degradation policy. And the more stringent constraints on
approval of activities that would adversely affect WSAs derive from state-specific wilderness
legislation rather than from NFMA. Yet by focusing on ecosystem characteristics and biological
communities, NFMA’s diversity regulations can provide useful guidance for defining
degradation and for identifying, restoring, and maintaining the integrity of important aquatic
ecosystems, especially those with “exceptional ecological significance,” through antidegradation requirements.
B. The Lessons of Federal Lands for Protecting Water Resources Against
Degradation
Among the federal land management statutes discussed in the previous section, the Park
Service Organic Act and the NWRSIA seem to provide the most appropriate guidance for
strengthening the CWA’s anti-degradation requirements. Although the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act can supply some lessons for the CWA, its aspirations for maintaining free-flowing rivers are
include standards or guidelines “to maintain or restore the diversity of ecosystems and habitat types throughout the
plan area,” including components to maintain or restore “(i) Key characteristics associated with terrestrial and
aquatic ecosystem types; (ii) Rare aquatic and terrestrial plant and animal communities; and (iii) The diversity of
native tree species similar to that existing in the plan area.” Id. at 21213 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.9(a)(2)).
It remains to be seen whether the 2012 regulations meaningfully constrain agency discretion.
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not as specific with respect to anything but dams as the nonimpairment provisions of those other
two laws, nor are its provisions as closely related to protecting the biological, chemical, or
physical integrity of the system. As a result it remains an underutilized tool and, arguably, a less
optimal analogue. The Wilderness Act already protects the components of high quality waters
that run through federally designated wilderness areas by prohibiting, with limited exceptions,
activities that would detract from wilderness values, including commercial activities that might
otherwise threaten water quality. The Act provides a less than ideal model for protecting high
quality waters outside the boundaries of wilderness areas, however, because a ban on all
discharges from industrial and commercial activities would impose unrealistic constraints that
upset the balance between environmental protection and economic growth that Congress
endorsed in 1987 by codifying EPA’s existing anti-degradation policy. As for the multiple-use
statutes, FLPMA and NFMA, with a few caveats, they are not particularly helpful to efforts to
strengthen the anti-degradation policy for reasons described above. 340
The Park Service Organic Act’s goals and mandates could be tailored to provide
appropriately enhanced protection for the nation’s high quality waters. The Act aims “to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide
for the enjoyment of the same in such manner . . . as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.” 341 NPS Policies recognize that conservation of plants and
animals presently and on into the future entails protecting not just individual species but
maintaining them “as parts of the natural ecosystems of parks.” 342 The Service also sees the
conservation of “evolving genetic diversity” as part of its mission. 343 The anti-degradation
policy could be amended to define “degradation” as impairment of water quality in a covered
water body that either results in loss or threatened loss of an existing use – especially fishing,
swimming, or higher uses – or adversely affects the ecological resilience of the water body, such
that its capacity to continue to provide important ecosystem services is reduced. Such a dual
standard would measure degradation by two yardsticks, one that focuses on suitability for
particular human uses and another that focuses on the role of the affected water body in the
ecosystem of which it is a part.
Yet the Organic Act is not perfect, and impairment of species within the National Park
System has occurred. Like the rest of North America, the System has experienced sharp declines
in the diversity and abundance of animal and plant species. 344 The culprits are found, for the
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most part, outside of park boundaries on adjacent federal, state, and private lands. Such
“external threats . . . could destabilize park wildlife populations and critical ecosystem services,
such as clean water and flood control.” 345 In particular, a 2009 National Parks Science
Committee Report observed that “the Park Service should provide far greater protection for
freshwater and marine systems” if it is to remain a “haven . . . for once-widespread species and
ecosystems.” 346 The “external threats” problem is relevant to the anti-degradation policy
because a Tier 3 river that runs through a wilderness area, for example, may have segments that
are not given Tier 3 protections, and thus can be degraded in ways that adversely affect the Tier
3 segment. 347
Still, water quality within the boundaries of the National Park System seems to be at least
somewhat better than outside of the System. In 1993, the Park Service established a nationwide
goal that by 2008 more than 99 percent of streams and rivers managed by the Service would
meet state and federal water quality standards adopted under the CWA. 348 To achieve this goal,
the Service, in partnership with the U.S. Geological Survey, has devoted attention to preparing
inventories of water quality in Park units. Not surprisingly, water quality within and among park
units varies significantly, making generalizations difficult. For example, water bodies within
Yellowstone National Park “continue to be of high quality.” 349 In the more populous MidAtlantic Region, which includes ten units in Pennsylvania and Virginia, 21 percent of the
ONRWs were impaired, and none had attained all of their designated uses. 350 System-wide, the
Park Service has fallen short of its 99 percent water quality compliance goal, but it appears to be
taking steps in the right direction under the Organic Act and, where applicable, the ONRW
provisions of the anti-degradation policy. 351 The existence of significant noncompliance even in
ONRWs, however, highlights the need for the imposition of restoration responsibilities on states
whose high quality waters violate water quality standards or other aspects of the anti-degradation
policy.
The NWRSIA can serve as another appropriate guidepost for improving the CWA’s antidegradation program. In one sense, at least, it may be even more useful than the Park Service
Organic Act. Economic uses of wildlife refuges may be allowed, but the stewardship
responsibilities embedded in the Refuge Act’s conservation mandate require decisionmakers to
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prevent economic uses and recreational uses from impairing Refuge resources. 352 The statute
unequivocally directs the FWS “to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance, healthy
populations of fish, wildlife, and plants.” 353 Like the Organic Act, the Refuge Act promotes
biological diversity and integrity of the system, but it includes more substantive management
criteria with “relatively rich detail.” 354 The Refuge Management Policy adds even more detail.
As Professor Fischman observed, “the Policy manages to make advancing the system mission of
conservation, supported by the integrity-diversity-health mandate, among others, a higher
priority than promoting wildlife-dependent recreation.” 355 This level of detail cabins the
agency’s discretion, and empowers citizens and courts to ensure implementation of the Act’s
conservation/non-impairment requirement. Drawing on the NWRSIA example, the CWA’s antidegradation policy could declare the issuance of permits involving discharges of specified
pollutants (or amounts of pollutants) to be incompatible (or presumptively incompatible) with
maintenance of the high quality waters protected by the policy. 356 The policy could distinguish
among the tiers of water bodies by limiting this approach to new or expanded discharges into
Tier 1 waters, but extending it to all discharges, including existing discharges, for Tier 3 (and
perhaps Tier 2) waters. This approach resembles the prohibition in FWS regulations on approval
of certain uses of the wildlife refuges absent a showing of compatibility. 357
V.

CONCLUSION

Building on forty years of experience with the CWA’s anti-degradation policy, and on the
comparative strengths and weaknesses of federal land management statutes, we offer four
recommendations to improve the anti-degradation policy. Each of the recommendations
responds to one of the deficiencies in the anti-degradation program identified in Part III.C above.
First, we recommend a federal regulation requiring states to designate ONRWs in their
WQS inventories, including waters within national parks and wildlife refuges and other waters of
“exceptional ecological significance.” 358 The current regulations fail to provide any direction
regarding the designation processes, beyond referencing parks and refuges; as a result, there is
inadequate protection for some of the nation’s most important aquatic resources. 359 In 1998,
EPA suggested in an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that States and tribes should be
required to establish a nomination process with criteria guidelines so that interested citizens or
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groups could petition for designation of certain waters as ONRWs. 360 The New Mexico
experience demonstrates how public involvement can promote the process of protecting high
quality waters, if citizens have a viable procedural mechanism and if sufficient criteria are
delineated to guide agency responses and allow meaningful judicial review. 361 These criteria
would elaborate on the meaning of “exceptional ecological significance,” perhaps using factors
similar to those by which the 2012 Forest Service planning regulations measure ecosystem
integrity. 362
In addition, states should be required to take concrete steps (including reducing aggregate
discharges) to restore the quality of Tier 3 and other high quality waters covered by the antidegradation policy that have already been degraded. EPA would be obliged to determine during
each triennial review of state water quality standards whether states have complied with this
responsibility. EPA’s failure to require restoration when the policy demands it would then be
judicially reviewable. 363 The imposition of a restoration mandate would be consistent with the
CWA’s overarching goal of “restor[ing]” as well as maintaining the integrity of the waters of the
United States. 364
Second, EPA should promulgate a regulatory definition of “degradation.” Formalizing
EPA’s informal guidance directing the regions to consider “assimilative capacity” would be a
step in the right direction. However, this step would not go far enough because it may result in
new or increased discharges on large lakes and rivers whose assimilative capacity appears to be
great but may not in fact be as great as presumed, or whose aquatic environment may not
respond in a predictable fashion to pollutants. In addition, a mandate to consider assimilative
capacity in isolation may still allow multiple discharges over time to severely affect the integrity
of a water body without undergoing a single, comprehensive anti-degradation review. 365
Looking to the NWRSIA and the Organic Act for guideposts, the new definition should include
substantive criteria and thresholds or triggers to guide the permitting process to better meet the
goals of the anti-degradation policy and the CWA as a whole and to enable meaningful citizen
involvement and judicial review. As suggested above, drawing on the analogy to the Park
Service experience, “degradation” could be defined as impairment of water quality that either
results in loss or threatened loss of an existing or potentially viable use – l especially fishing,
swimming, and higher uses – or adversely affects the ecological resilience of the water body,
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such that its capacity to continue to provide important ecosystem services is reduced. 366 In
addition, based on the NWRSIA example, the issuance of permits involving discharges of
specified pollutants (or amounts of pollutants) could be declared incompatible (or presumptively
incompatible) with maintenance of the high quality waters protected by the anti-degradation
policy. 367
Third, states should be required to extend their anti-degradation programs to nonpoint
source runoff. One of the biggest holes in the anti-degradation policy is the failure to regulate
nonpoint sources that degrade water quality. States have the discretion to extend their antidegradation requirements to nonpoint sources, but it appears that states cannot be forced to do
so. 368 Even when state anti-degradation requirements nominally apply to nonpoint sources, those
requirements sometimes effectively have no substantive content. 369 As noted above, a few courts
have upheld the EPA’s approval of a state’s water quality standards that exempted nonpoint
source discharges from anti-degradation requirements. 370 However, EPA once took the position
that “[n]onpoint source activities are not exempt from the provisions of the anti-degradation
policy.” 371 A persuasive argument can be made that EPA should reinvigorate this position, and
indeed that it has an affirmative duty to ensure that state programs for nonpoint source
pollution—including anti-degradation programs—do not defeat the CWA’s objectives. Some
judicial interpretation of the CWA supports state efforts to control nonpoint source pollution
through anti-degradation requirements. The water quality standard-setting process applies to
waters polluted by both point source and nonpoint source pollution. 372 Further, EPA regulations
already require the states to “achieve[] . . . cost-effective and reasonable best management
practices for nonpoint source control.” 373
Fourth, to address EPA’s failure to provide consistent follow through on requiring states
to properly implement the anti-degradation policy, mandatory state planning and assessment
responsibilities could be added. For example, states might be required to consider as part of the
triennial water quality standard revision process whether the designation of additional Tier 1, 2,
or 3 waters is appropriate and document the results of that assessment. In addition, the states
should be required to explain any refusal to designate ONRWs in response to the petition process
366
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described above. EPA would have to consider the state’s explanation in deciding whether to
approve or disapprove state water quality standards as consistent with CWA requirements. 374
EPA determinations would then be judicially reviewable. The CWA already requires states to
engage in a continuing planning process that includes “adequate implementation . . . for revised
or new water quality standards,” which of course include the anti-degradation policy. 375 State
planning responsibilities are far less rigorous under the CWA than they are under the CAA, and
efforts by EPA during the Clinton Administration to mandate planning obligations to achieve
water quality standards similar to state implementation plan duties under the CAA ran into
insurmountable political opposition. 376 Enhancement of selected aspects of state water quality
standard implementation, such as those relating to compliance with the anti-degradation policy,
is worth another look.
These four reforms would promote the primary goals of the anti-degradation policy,
especially providing a margin of safety, protecting high-value natural resources, preventing the
development of pollution havens, and balancing environmental goals and economic growth
opportunities. These reforms would also do much to move the nation’s water bodies beyond the
“least common denominator” of fishable/swimmable waters and toward the CWA’s overarching
goal of maintaining as well as restoring the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of aquatic
environments.

374

33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4) (2006).
Id. § 1313(e)(3)(F).
376
See Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and the Chesapeake Bay, 41 Envtl.
L. Rep. (News & Analysis) 10208, 10213 (2011).
375

51

